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INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2005, almost exactly a month after Hurricane
Katrina made landfall, the mayor of New Orleans convened a group of
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civic leaders to begin the process of rebuilding the city.1 The civic leaders,
known as the Bring New Orleans Back Commission (“BNOB”), faced a
staggering task: 80% of the city had been under a toxic soup of floodwater
in the wake of the storm, and the Corps of Engineers had finished pumping
it out only a week earlier.2 The city government was in disarray. None of
the major functions associated with urban life in modern America was
operating normally.3 Vast swaths of the city had no electricity or drinking
water, and the police force was in shambles.4 Order was being maintained
by the National Guard, and with the city jail flooded, prisoners were being
held in makeshift cages made of chain-link fences and razor wire built
inside the city’s Amtrak station.5 The bodies of those killed in the storm
were still largely unaccounted for.6
Behind the immediate chaos, a broader question loomed: how should
the city rebuild? In the months following the storm, a study conducted by
the RAND Corporation at the request of the BNOB estimated that the parts
of the city that had been under more than four feet of water would regain
no more than 30% of their population within three years.7 Foreseeing
sparsely populated neighborhoods heavily sprinkled with abandoned,
rotting houses, most experts believed that attempting to maintain the city’s
original footprint with only a fraction of its population was a recipe for
disaster.8 Meanwhile, the intense devastation meted out on the city
highlighted what appeared at the time to be an unavoidable truth: many of
the city’s neighborhoods sat well below sea level and thus would never be
truly safe.9 The only way to keep New Orleanians out of harm’s way for
the indefinite future, it seemed, was to move them to higher ground.
To address this issue, the BNOB called in a set of experts: a panel of
urban planning professionals from around the country affiliated with the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

GARY RIVLIN, KATRINA: AFTER THE FLOOD 158 (2015).
Id. at 124–26.
Id. at 159–61.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 123, 126–27.
K EVIN M C C ARTHY ET AL., RAND G ULF S TATES P OL’ Y I NST., T HE
REPOPULATION OF NEW ORLEANS A FTER H URRICANE K ATRINA 27 (2006),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR36
9.pdf [https://perma.cc/P34P-M7J6].
8. See Richard Campanella, Delta Urbanism and New Orleans: After,
PLACES J. (Apr. 2010), https://placesjournal.org/article/delta-urbanism-and-neworleans-after/ [https://perma.cc/U32Q-RM7B].
9. Timothy M. Kusky, Time to move to higher ground, BOS. GLOBE (Sept.
25, 2005), http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles
/2005/09/25/time_to_move_to_higher_ground/ [https://perma.cc/93GE-86X8].
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Urban Land Institute, whose members flew to New Orleans in November
2005 to conduct a “summit” and come up with a solution to the “footprint
problem.”10 After a few weeks of study and a handful of public meetings,
the group released its preliminary findings: a set of the worst-flooded
neighborhoods in New Orleans, the BNOB argued, should be abandoned
and allowed to revert to “green space.”11 These determinations eventually
landed on the front page of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, accompanied
by a large map depicting the neighborhoods slated for abandonment covered
by opaque green circles.12
The “green dot map,” as it came to be known, triggered a political
firestorm.13 Displaced residents reacted with fury to the idea that they
would be forbidden from returning to their homes and reconstructing their
lives, and meetings held after the plan became public were jammed with
people objecting forcefully to the idea of the city government preventing
them from rebuilding.14 Within a week, the mayor announced that he
would oppose the plan’s call for a moratorium on building permits in the
green dot neighborhoods.15 The BNOB was unceremoniously disbanded,
10. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 168–69.
11. Frank Donze, Don’t Write Us Off, Residents Warn: Urban Land Institute
Report Takes a Beating, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1.
12. Frank Donze & Gordon Russell, 4 Months to Decide: Nagin Panel Says
Hardest Hit Areas Must Prove Viability; City’s Footprint May Shrink; Full Buyouts
Proposed for Those Forced to Move; New Housing to Be Developed in Vast Swaths
of New Orleans’ Higher Ground, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 11, 2006, at A1.
13. Richard Campanella, A Katrina Lexicon: How We Talk About a Disaster
So Monumental We Can’t Agree on What to Call It, PLACES J. (July 2015),
https://doi.org/10.22269/150727 [hereinafter Campanella, A Katrina Lexicon]
[https://perma.cc/DG6S-HS9C]; ROBERTA BRANDES GRATZ, WE’RE STILL HERE
YA BASTARDS: HOW THE PEOPLE OF NEW ORLEANS REBUILT THEIR CITY 41
(2015) (noting that the green dot map was “explosive” and “galvanized a potent,
citywide opposition”).
14. See Frank Donze, Let Us Decide on Rebuilding, Residents Say: Don’t
Stymie Neighborhoods, City Officials Told at Meetings, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 15,
2006, at B1 [hereinafter Donze, Let Us Decide]; Gordon Russell & Frank Donze,
Rebuilding Proposal Gets Mixed Reception: Damaged Neighborhoods Must Prove
Viability; Critics Vocal at Meeting, but Most Content to Watch and Wait, TIMESPICAYUNE, Jan. 12, 2006, at A1.
15. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 217. The mayor explained that he was “a propertyrights person” and that he believed that the people of New Orleans could “decide
intelligently for themselves where they want to rebuild.” Id. He later insisted that
the city could make no promises in terms of restoring services to the neighborhoods
in question: “If you go in those areas, God bless you . . . . We’ll try to provide you
with support as best we can. But understand we’re concentrating city resources in
the areas that are in the immediate recovery zone.” Id. at 239.
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and all talk of retreat was off the table.16 New Orleanians would be free to
rebuild where they saw fit.
The utter failure of New Orleans’s attempt to enforce retreat from its
most vulnerable areas is best seen as the opening act in a drama that is
likely to play out across the United States over the course of the next few
decades. Although predicting the exact amount of sea level rise the world
is likely to experience in any particular span of time is impossible,
conservative estimates project roughly three feet of increase in sea level
by 2100.17 At least one recent study has suggested that seas could rise by
several feet within the next 50 years.18 The effects of a several-foot
increase in sea levels are likely to be dramatic. One study estimated that a
three foot increase in sea level would displace roughly 4.2 million
Americans, and a six foot increase would displace 13.1 million Americans.19
Indeed, the effects of inundation are already beginning to be felt. Routine
tidal flooding is disrupting life in many coastal communities, closing
streets, killing plants, polluting water supplies, and making roads
impassable.20 Inundation caused by rising sea levels is only one aspect of
16. Richard Campanella, “Bring Your Own Chairs”: Civic Engagement in
Postdiluvial New Orleans, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE WAKE OF KATRINA 23,
35 (Amy Koritz & George J. Sanchez eds., 2009) [hereinafter Campanella, “Bring
Your Own Chairs”].
17. Justin Gillis, Seas Are Rising at Fastest Rate in Last 28 Centuries, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/science/sea-levelrise-global-warming-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/9Z7F-YZTP].
18. Justin Gillis, Scientists Warn of Perilous Climate Shift Within Decades,
Not Centuries, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23
/science/global-warming-sea-level-carbon-dioxide-emissions.html [https://perma
.cc/2ERJ-JJPQ].
19. Tatiana Schlossberg, Rising Sea Levels May Disrupt Lives of Millions, Study
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/science/ris
ing-sea-levels-global-warming-climate-change.html (discussing Matthew E. Hauer et
al., Millions Projected to be at Risk from Sea-level Rise in the Continental United
States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691 (2016)) [https://perma.cc/RWF4-ZFVM].
The study’s authors concluded that coastal inundation could lead to a population
shift comparable to the “Great Migration” of African-Americans out of the South
in the 20th century. Id.
20. Gillis, Seas Are Rising at Fastest Rate in Last 28 Centuries, supra note
17 (noting that “increasingly routine” flooding is “making life miserable in places
like Miami Beach; Charleston, S.C.; and Norfolk, Va., even on sunny days”);
Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already Begun,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science/flood
ing-of-coast-caused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html [https://perma.cc
/9MA3-5QEW].
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the looming flooding problem: climate change is also projected to increase
the severity of rain storms and hurricanes, worsening catastrophic flooding
events in inland areas as well as on the coasts.21
The nation’s ever-increasing flood risk has led to a chorus of calls for
some form of retreat.22 Observing that policies at all levels of government
have for nearly a century encouraged coastal development in various ways,
experts in planning, climate change, and disaster law have argued that
government now needs to begin the process of moving people away from
the areas most exposed to flood risk.23 There are a range of legal
mechanisms available to implement retreat, but for the most part they have

21. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 9, 37, 40 (Jerry M.
Melillo, Terese Richmond & Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014), nca2014.globalchange.gov
[https://perma.cc/G2HC-GMTQ]. This problem was vividly illustrated in August
2016, when rainfall in southern Louisiana caused flooding that killed 13 people and
displaced tens of thousands. The event was the eighth since May 2015 involving a
quantity of rainfall statistically rare enough to have only a 0.2 percent chance of
occurring in any given year (also known as a 500-year flood). Jonah Engel
Bromwich, Flooding in the South Looks a Lot Like Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/us/climate-change-louisiana
.html [https://perma.cc/7UFK-BF4R].
22. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat is the
Best Option: Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change
Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 695, 696 (2014); ANNE SIDERS, COLUM. LAW
SCH. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS (Oct.
2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/file s/microsites/climatechange/files/Publications/Fellows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pd
f [https://perma.cc/U53S-KVS9]; Michael Kimmelman, Going with the Flow, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2013, at AR1 (describing a proposal by Governor Cuomo to pay
residents of flood-prone areas to relocate); J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed:
Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 73 (2012); Lisa A.
St. Amand, Sea Level Rise and Coastal Wetlands: Opportunities for a Peaceful
Migration, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (describing a strategy of
“institutionalizing the presumption that humanly-constructed structures will have
to give way to migrating wetlands as sea level rises”); N. Y. STATE SEA LEVEL RISE
T ASK F ORCE , REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 60 (2010), http://www.dec.ny
.gov/docs/administration_pdf /slrtffinalrep.pdf (calling for reducing “incentives that
increase or perpetuate development in high-risk locations” and creating “incentives
for sustainable adaptation planning,” particularly “adaptive transition of
infrastructure and development over time”) [https://perma.cc/6PKQ -AJWH].
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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failed to achieve any meaningful progress.24 Indeed, the nation’s coastal
counties are still growing in population.25 Perhaps in part because human
perception of risk is never so keen as when risks have just been realized,
calls for retreat from particular areas are often strongest in the immediate
aftermath of disasters, when homes sit empty and the evidence of the risk
is hard to ignore.26 But as the example of New Orleans shows, the views
of experts on the wisdom of retreat and the views of the people who live
in risky locations often diverge, particularly after a storm.27 The consensus
view in the scholarly and scientific communities on the need to retreat
from flood-prone areas thus runs up against a problematic obstacle:
nobody wants to leave.28
In fact, flood victims’ reactions to disasters are often characterized by
an intense desire to rebuild that is expressed in heated, adversarial terms. 29
24. See Verchick & Johnson, supra note 22, at 695; Peter Byrne & Jessica
Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 267, 268 (Michael B. Gerard & Katrina Fischer Kuhn eds., 2012); Lisa
Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the
Future of the American City, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2157, 2161 (2011).
25. See Hauer et al., supra note 19, at 691; see also Dan Frosch & Cameron
McWhirter, Houston’s Rapid Growth, Heavy Rains, Heighten Flood Risk, WALL
ST. J. (May 19, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/houstons-rapid-growthheavy-rains-heighten-flood-risk-1463680866 (noting that “[m]any cities in the
South and along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts have grown faster than other parts
of the country in recent decades and become much more prone to flooding” and
that the Houston-Woodlands-Sugarland metropolitan area was the fastest growing
in the country between 2010 and 2015) [https://perma.cc/7PSR-NQYD]. In
addition to simply putting more people in flood-prone areas, population growth
makes flooding worse, as land that is paved over is less able to absorb water. Id.
(“[W]hen heavy downpours hit, the rain has no place to drain . . . . In the last 15
years, the amount of impervious surface—mostly pavement—has grown 25% in
Harris county, which includes Houston . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Kusky, supra note 9.
27. Compare id. (discussing the need to potentially relocate in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina), with Donze, Let Us Decide, supra note 14 (discussing New
Orleans residents’ efforts to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina).
28. See Verchick & Johnson, supra note 22, at 695 (“We Americans are more
interested in fortifying our castles or building them higher than in moving out of
harm’s way.”).
29. Although the focus of this Article is on flood risk, and especially
hurricanes, the insights offered are to some extent generalizable to certain other
natural disasters, particularly when the nature of the risks involved is tied to living
in a certain area or in a certain manner. For instance, wildfires have become more
common and more destructive in recent years, exacerbated, like floods, both by
climate change and increasing settlement in certain high-risk areas. See, e.g., Max
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In the wake of disasters, residents frequently respond not by treating their
homes as sunk costs and dispassionately reevaluating their decision to live
in flood-prone areas but by asserting, often angrily, that they will never
“surrender,”30 that “retreat is not an option,”31 and that they are “stronger
than the storm.”32 This emotional response to disasters is one of the key
obstacles standing in the way of the road to more resilient housing patterns,
and yet it typically is ignored by the community of scholars who study
disaster law and policy.33
Although there are a range of cultural, historical, geographical, and
economic factors that affect the response to any individual storm, as well
as factors that affect the response of any particular individual, the
emotional drivers of rebuilding can be illuminated by a set of analogies.
First, rebuilding can be an act of revenge. Tort theorists have seen in tort
law a mechanism by which people seek revenge against those who have
wronged them.34 Similarly, rebuilding is revenge in that it represents a
victory over the storm that destroyed one’s home. What this accomplishes
A. Moritz & Scott Gabriel Knowles, Coexisting with Fire, 104 AM. SCIENTIST
220 (2016) (noting that problematic fire suppression policies are fostered by the
fact that “the primary response is to fight fires rather than accept them as a
recurring fact of life”).
30. Campanella, “Bring Your Own Chairs”, supra note 16, at 28 (showing a
photograph of large banner hung over the entrance of popular, locally-owned
barbershop).
31. Paul Mulshine, Desert the Jersey Shore? Retreat is Not an Option, STARLEDGER (Feb. 5, 2013, 8:24 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_paul_mulshine/2013/02
/desert_the_jersey_shore_retrea.html [https://perma.cc/Y322-JVV6].
32. See New Jersey Going Strong, New Jersey: Stronger than the Storm TV
Commercial, YOUTUBE (May 16, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
QaHQNSGlfTs [https://perma.cc/7AHN-V5KE].
33. To be sure, scholars have noted the difficulty of imposing retreat in the
wake of disasters and have offered a handful of explanations for this phenomenon
and policy recommendations aimed at addressing it. See, e.g., Byrne & Grannis,
supra note 24, at 270 (“Regulators often lack the political will (or authority) to
prevent redevelopment, especially after a major disaster . . . .”). The issue, however,
has not been addressed in any real depth.
34. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:
Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J.
524, 602 (2005) (“Redress through law, as Locke and Blackstone understood, is
a substitute for vengeance.”); Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 86, 87 n.11 (John
Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“[A]n an age-old purpose of the law of torts is to provide a
substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful injury.” (quoting Mathias v. Accor
Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.))); Emily
Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1397 (2003).
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is not retribution—inflicting pain on someone who has pained you—but
expression, a performance in support of a message, a reclaiming of both
material losses and normative status.
Second, rebuilding is culture. Although traditional regulatory efforts
to enforce retreat are premised on a dichotomy between rational and
irrational responses to risk, there is a growing movement among scholars
of risk perception to understand many decisions about risk as culturally
expressive rather than rational or irrational.35 Thus, when people choose
to rebuild in an area they know is prone to floods, it is possible that in
doing so they are expressing deep cultural commitments rather than
behaving irrationally. Because floods impact communities, rebuilding also
expresses a commitment to community that may well be a fundamental
aspect of self-identity.
Third and finally, rebuilding can be an act of resistance. Flood risk is
disproportionately concentrated in low-income, minority communities.36
When floods occur, those same communities often lack the resources to
avoid their worst effects, making many storms vivid illustrations of societal
inequalities.37 For many of its victims, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that
the government regarded them as not worthy of protection.38 Although
rebuilding in these cases might be a way of countering this message, a
prohibition on rebuilding only makes that message stronger. By trying to
enforce retreat in the wake of floods that have disparate impacts, governments
appear to signal their desire to rid themselves of particular groups entirely.
Rebuilding thus becomes an act of political resistance, a way of avoiding
being erased and getting even with wealthier, drier communities.
Understanding the expressive aspects of recovery helps show why efforts
to prevent rebuilding in the wake of storms have failed so spectacularly. If
rebuilding contains elements of revenge, expresses cultural commitments
about risk, helps reinforce a sense of identity, and provides a form of
resistance against unequal treatment, then society may have more success
using traditional regulatory tools to enforce retreat if it also makes
meaningful efforts to address the emotional significance of rebuilding.
35. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 745 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan, Two Conceptions];
Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55
EMORY L.J. 569 (2006); Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental
Equity in New Orleans, 1890-1930, 28 J. OF HIST. GEOGRAPHY 237, 237 (2002).
37. See infra notes 190–195 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 200–204 and accompanying text.
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This Article begins the process of thinking through what those
measures might look like—the ways in which some form of repair might
be offered to those who are prevented from pursuing their own private
form of recovery. Part I discusses the problem of retreat from flood-prone
areas and reviews the array of legal mechanisms that have been put
forward as ways of encouraging it, with particular emphasis on the call to
abandon certain areas in the wake of floods. Part II presents a set of
analogies that help explain the intense desire to rebuild after floods. These
observations lead to new insights about what rebuilding accomplishes and
why forbidding it has proven to be so difficult. Part III considers some of
the ways in which the desire to rebuild might be satisfied, at least partially,
without moving people back into harm’s way.
I. ADVANCE AND RETREAT
Americans have spent much of the past century enthusiastically
populating low-lying, flood-prone areas.39 Federal policies have for
decades contributed to this problem. First, large-scale engineering projects
aimed at preventing flooding from rivers and oceans have attracted
development to what would otherwise be uninhabitable land, land that
often ends up flooded anyway.40 In addition to attracting people to risky
areas, flood control projects can also make flooding itself worse in a
variety of complex ways. When the banks of rivers are armored with
levees to prevent flooding, water that might naturally spread out and slow
39. See Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of
Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for
Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SCI. 171, 173–76
(2006); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program
and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62–63, 66 (1985).
40. New Orleans East, a vast suburban neighborhood that before Hurricane
Katrina was the home of much of the city’s black middle class, is a stark example.
The area sits well below sea level and was an empty swamp until after Hurricane
Betsy, which sparked the development of a comprehensive levee system
surrounding New Orleans. By including the empty swamp that became New
Orleans East within the levee system, the federal government was able to add the
economic boon enjoyed by developers to its cost-benefit analysis, substantially
reducing the apparent burden of the project. Forty years later, the neighborhood
was under eight feet of water and 68 of its residents were dead. Sebastian N.
Jonkman et al., Loss of Life Caused by the Flooding of New Orleans After
Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Relationship Between Flood Characteristics
and Mortality, 29 RISK ANALYSIS 676, 690 (2009). Notably, this figure includes
only bodies located in the neighborhood, not residents of the neighborhood who
died in facilities like hospitals and shelters. Id.
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down in a floodplain is forced downriver, increasing the risk of floods in
other areas.41 Preventing seasonal flooding also deprives coastal deltas of
their source of silt, which accelerates subsidence and erosion and thus
increases the risk of flooding from the sea.42 Coastal armoring projects
also risk worsening the flooding they are built to prevent. Rigid concrete
walls designed to prevent the erosion of sandy beaches have actually
accelerated this process by changing the way in which waves pick up and
deposit sand.43
Federally subsidized flood insurance has attracted people to floodprone areas for half a century. Because flood risk is costly, difficult to
measure, and highly correlated,44 private insurers had essentially stopped
issuing flood insurance by the middle of the Twentieth century. In
response, the federal government created the National Flood Insurance
Program (“NFIP”), which provides flood insurance and requires that
participating communities enact building codes that help make floodprone areas more resistant to flood damage.45 The problem is that a
substantial portion of policyholders have always been charged rates that
are significantly below levels that reflect the true “actuarial” risk they
face.46 Artificially cheap flood insurance partially socializes the costs of
flooding and signals to homeowners that the risk they face is lower than it
actually is.

41. Houck, supra note 39, at 81.
42. Robert Giegengack & Kenneth R. Foster, Physical Constraints on
Reconstructing New Orleans, in REBUILDING URBAN PLACES AFTER DISASTER:
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 13, 21–23, 26 (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan
M. Wacther eds., 2006).
43. See ORRIN H. PILKEY & KATHARINE DIXON WHEELER, THE CORPS AND
THE SHORE 1–5 (Island Press 1998).
44. “Correlation” in the context of insurance refers to the likelihood that a
given risk will be realized by multiple policyholders at the same time. The chance
of an individual dying of a heart attack is unrelated to the chance of his neighbor
dying of a heart attack; the chance of a home flooding is highly correlated with
the chance of its neighbor flooding at the same time. See James Ming Chen,
Correlation, Coverage, and Catastrophe: The Contours of Financial
Preparedness for Disaster, 26 FORDHAM ENVT’L L. REV. 56, 65–66 (2014)
(referring to correlation as “the most insidious factor undermining the financial
integrity of private insurance for catastrophic risk”).
45. See The National Flood Insurance Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4081.
46. As of 2010, the GAO estimated that about 22% of NFIP policyholders
paid subsidized rates. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-631T,
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES 6 (2010).
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The most dramatic way the government has socialized flood risk—and
thereby encouraged people to live in flood-prone areas—is by allocating
massive aid packages in the wake of disasters.47 The Stafford Act allows
state governors to request that the President issue a “major disaster”
declaration, which allows the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”) to provide federal assistance to state recovery efforts from the
agency’s Disaster Relief Fund.48 The Stafford Act’s definition of “major
disaster” is extremely broad and has led to federal assistance for seemingly
routine events like snowstorms.49 There are a handful of modern reform
proposals aimed at reducing the amount of federal disaster relief by
changing things like the accounting mechanics of the Disaster Relief Fund
or the formula used by FEMA to determine when a disaster overwhelms
state resources such that federal assistance is necessary.50 Such efforts,
however, seem unlikely to meaningfully reduce congressional willingness
to provide funding whenever disaster strikes.51
The result of these policies, and the general modern taste for coastal
living,52 is a dangerous concentration of people, homes, businesses, and
47. Less than two weeks after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Congress
allocated $51.8 billion in aid, by overwhelming margins. Peter Baker & Amy
Goldstein, Congress Approves $51.8 Billion for Victims, WASH. POST (Sept. 9,
2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/09/09/congressapproves-518-billion-for-victims/25a2e6e2-4abf-4475-b617-e9e13895a105/?utm
_term=.85d6c98b916b [https://perma.cc/6F8T-G9LG]. That appropriation was
merely the first in a series of allocations, which eventually amounted to about $120
billion in aid. BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43537, FEMA’S
DISASTER RELIEF FUND: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 13 (2014). The total
amount of federal funds allocated after Hurricane Sandy was roughly $60 billion.
Lindsay, supra, at 13.
48. LINDSAY, supra note 47, at 2–3.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 13–18.
51. The federal government has been remarkably solicitous of the needs of
disaster victims for as long as there has been a federal government. See Michele
L. Landis, Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’: Disaster Relief and the Origins
of the Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 973–1034 (1998).
52. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition
of Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 295, 309–
10 (2003) (describing various factors making coastal living appealing). Barnhizer
also notes that a boom in coastal development from the 1970s to the 1990s
coincided with a lull in hurricane activity, making coastal investments appear
safer than they actually are. Id. at 310; see also Robert J. Meyer, Why We UnderPrepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE
KATRINA 153, 160 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard Kunreuther
eds., 2006) (noting that between 1887 and 1969, hurricanes hit South Florida at
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infrastructure in risky, flood-prone areas. A 2013 study commissioned by
FEMA estimated that increasingly intense rainstorms and sea level rise
would lead to dramatic increases in the size of flood zones along coasts
and rivers and in the average losses per flood insurance policy.53 Estimates
of the cost of this increased flooding are by necessity rough, but they are
nonetheless alarming. A recent study estimated that at current rates of sea
level rise, as much as $507 billion worth of existing coastal property will
be underwater by 2100.54 Estimates based on more recent, more dire
predictions of six feet of sea level rise over the next century put those
figures much higher: $882 billion, according to the real estate website
Zillow, which based its figure on maps released by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration.55 At six feet of sea level rise, almost 300
American cities would lose at least half their homes, and 36 cities would
be completely lost.56

an average rate of one every three years, but between 1970 and 1992, the region
was hit by only two and saw an explosion in coastal development).
53. Becky Hayat & Robert Moore, Natural Res. Def. Council, Addressing
Affordability and Long-Term Resiliency Through the National Flood Insurance
Program, 45 ENVT’L L. REP. 10338, 10339–40 (2015). High-risk flood areas
along rivers would increase in size by 45% by 2100, leading to an increase in the
number of policyholders along rivers of 80% over the same period. The equivalent
figures for coastal areas are a 55% increase in flood zones, causing a 130%
increase in policyholders. Id. The study also estimated a 90% increase in the
average loss cost per policy. Id.
54. KATE GORDON ET AL., RISKY BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2014), http://riskybusiness.org/site
/assets/uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3XJ9-HWM7]. The study also estimated that there is a five percent chance
that $701 billion worth of existing coastal property would be below mean sea
levels by 2100. Id.
55. Krishna Rao, Climate Change and Housing: Will a Rising Tide Sink all
Homes?, ZILLOW (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.zillow.com/research/climatechange-underwater-homes-12890/ [https://perma.cc/58C5-SVE6]. Notably, this
figure does not include damage to public infrastructure or commercial real estate,
nor does it factor in estimated increases in the population of coastal counties over
the same period, which currently range from 50% to 144%. Rob Moore, Five
Climate-Smart Actions to Reform Flood Insurance, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL
(Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/rob-moore/five-climate-smartactions-reform-flood-insurance (discussing Zillow report) [https://perma.cc
/8YKK-TJTZ].
56. Rao, supra note 55. Notably, 17.8% of Boston’s housing stock would be
underwater, as would 24.8% of Honolulu’s housing stock and 30.5% of Miami’s
housing stock. Id.
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Although engineering projects might protect major population centers
from inundation in some cases, they are not likely to present a
comprehensive solution to the problem of sea level rise. For the reasons
noted above, flood control projects often end up worsening exposure to
flood risks in various ways.57 In other cases, the protection they afford is
simply too expensive58 or involves protecting some people in exchange for
increasing the risk faced by others, which is a moral calculus that is
unappealing at best.59 In other areas, most notably Miami, there is
essentially nothing engineers can do.60 In many cases, the inescapable
conclusion is that the only way to avoid flooding is to move to higher
ground.61
A range of legal mechanisms exist by which governments can foster
retreat, none of which have been particularly successful. The most
straightforward approach is for local governments to “downzone” floodprone areas, proactively limiting new development on private parcels.62
Governments can also create setbacks or buffers so that homes built on
large lots must be situated away from floodplains. Exactions can also be

57. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
58. See Jon Gertner, Should the United States Save Tangier Island from
Oblivion?, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10
/magazine/should-the-united-states-save-tangier-island-from-oblivion.html?mcu
bz=1 (noting that saving a small island in Chesapeake Bay from inundation would
cost an estimated $30 million to protect a population of 470 people) [https:
//perma.cc/N4SP-V9F5?safari=1].
59. Hurricane Sandy renewed discussion of whether New York City, like
London, should construct a flood control barrier across the entrance to its harbor.
Mireya Navarro, Weighing Sea Barriers as Protection for New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2012, at A21. The project was estimated to cost between $10 and $17
billion and worsen flooding in areas outside its protection by as much as 20%. Id.
The idea was explicitly rejected in Mayor Bloomberg’s comprehensive plan for
making the city more resilient in the face of floods. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL
INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT
NEW YORK 49 (June 11, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/sir/html/report/re
port.shtml (discussing downsides of two possible harbor barrier proposals)
[https://perma.cc/94YF-253X].
60. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Siege of Miami: As Temperatures Climb, So,
Too, Will Sea Levels, NEW YORKER (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2015/12/21/the-siege-of-miami (describing the “intractable” geology
of South Florida: “Building a dike on porous limestone is like putting a fence on
top of a tunnel: it alters the route of travel, but not necessarily the amount.”)
[https://perma.cc/QX63-4CCM].
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
62. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 272–73.
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used to secure easements or other commitments from developers in
exchange for necessary permits.63 These approaches can limit future
development and prevent redevelopment when structures are damaged.64
Although such land use decisions and the zoning laws that enforce
them are the responsibility of local governments, several federal statutes
encourage local governments to take issues relating to climate change, sea
level rise, and flooding into account. The Coastal Zone Management Act
(“CZMA”) encourages states to develop coastal management programs
and makes them eligible for federal funds if they do so.65 States are
encouraged, but not required, to take sea level rise into account in
developing their plans.66 Similarly, the Disaster Mitigation Act (“DMA”)
encourages states to develop disaster mitigation plans, again in exchange
for federal funds.67
The requirements of the NFIP are stronger and more properly
characterized as substantive. To be eligible to participate in the program—
and thus allow their residents to purchase flood insurance—local
governments must pass zoning ordinances that mandate certain adaptations
to mitigate flood risk.68 Chief among these is the requirement that within
what are known as “100-year flood zones,” new properties and properties
that are substantially rebuilt after being flooded must be elevated above
what FEMA determines is a statistically average flood depth—the “base
flood elevation.”69 In many cases, this requirement can mean elevating a

63. Id. at 273.
64. Id. at 272–73.
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012); see also John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation
Through Land Use Strategies, 37 ENVT’ L. L. REP. 10681, 10686–87 (2007).
66. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 272.
67. Nolon, supra note 65, at 10683–85; Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub.
Law 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552–1576 (amending chapter 68 of Title 42 of the United
States Code). These requirements are largely procedural in the sense that the
DMA does not actually require that states implement their disaster mitigation
plans, only that they develop them. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 272; see
also Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical
Axis, 39 COLUM. J. ENVT’L. L. 390, 408–12 (2014). Kaswan concludes her survey
of federal activity in this area by noting that federal laws “do not systematically
require local or state climate assessment, planning, or adaptation measures” and
that “[f]ederal programs often provide willing state and local governments with
valuable information and piecemeal funding but do not provide a comprehensive
or coordinated land-use response.” Id. at 412.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4022, 4102(c); 44 C.F.R. § 59.22(a)(3) (2017).
69. This is a very broad-brush description of an extremely complex
regulatory regime. For more detail, see Alexander B. Lemann, Rolling Back the
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home as much as a dozen feet above the surrounding grade, and when the
expense makes doing this impractical, these zoning ordinances can force
people to abandon properties that have been substantially damaged by
floods.70 The NFIP also requires that homeowners in 100-year flood zones
with a mortgage from a federally regulated bank carry flood insurance, and
in some cases the premiums are expensive enough to force people to move
or to dissuade people from buying flood-prone properties in the first
place.71
Still, the NFIP also serves as a vivid illustration of how profoundly
difficult it is to encourage retreat. When the program was reformed in 2012
to eliminate certain categories of artificially cheap premiums, 72 the
resulting increase in prices sparked an immediate backlash, leading
Congress to undo many of its reforms only 20 months after passing them.73
Although there are certainly instances in which the NFIP’s requirements
effectively force people out of flood-prone properties, the idea that flood
insurance should be “affordable” continues to enjoy broad support,74 and
Tide: Toward an Individual Mandate for Flood Insurance, 26 FORDHAM ENVT’L.
L. REV. 166, 182–87 (2015).
70. See, e.g., Renee Peck, Elevated Houses Making a Mark on Post-Katrina
New Orleans Landscape, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 23, 2008), http://blog.nola.com
/reneepeck/2008/08/elevated_house_making_a_mark_o.html [https://perma.cc/2
XSN-RJ4R]; Adam Nossiter, Rebuilding New Orleans, One Appeal at a Time,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/us/national
special/rebuilding-new-orleans-one-appeal-at-a-time.html [https://perma.cc/V5V
7-JJX9].
71. See Lemann, supra note 69, at 196–200, 212–13, 212 n.191, 213 n.192.
72. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, § 100205, Pub.
L. No. 112-141, Title II, 126 Stat. 916 (2012); see also Lemann, supra note 69, at
192–96 (describing reforms enacted by Biggert-Waters).
73. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-89, 128 Stat. 1020.
74. For example, a bill designed to encourage private insurers to issue flood
insurance policies—in large part in the hope that such policies would be more
affordable than those issued by the NFIP—passed the House in April 2016 by a
vote of 419 to 0. See Flood Insurance Market Parity and Modernization Act, H.R.
2901, 114th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, Apr. 28, 2016); see
also 162 CONG. REC. H1952 (2016) (statement by Rep. Ross, the bill’s sponsor,
emphasizing the need to provide “more affordable consumer options in the flood
insurance marketplace”). The Senate never voted on the bill. S. 1679, 114th Cong.
(2015). The bill was re-introduced in both the House and the Senate in 2017. See
Flood Insurance Market Development Act of 2017, H.R. 1422, S. 563, 115th
Cong. (2017). As this Article goes to press, the NFIP is again the focus of a reform
effort, as it is due for reauthorization before the end of 2017. See Thomas Kaplan &
Mary Williams Walsh, White House Asks Congress for $29 Billion in Hurricane
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using insurance premiums to encourage retreat in any large-scale way
appears to be a political non-starter. Even the mechanisms the NFIP
already employs often fall short. The program’s reliance on the presence
of a mortgage as the trigger for requiring flood insurance and on banks and
financial regulators for enforcement means that in many areas surprisingly
few people are required to maintain flood insurance, and even those who
are required to have flood insurance often do not.75
Even when governments decide to use their zoning power to enforce
retreat, they encounter a more serious obstacle: the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution.76 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
the United States Supreme Court held that South Carolina’s Beachfront
Management Act had effected a taking by preventing the plaintiff from
constructing any permanent, habitable structure on two beachfront lots.77
The state law had been enacted in 1988 in response to the problem of
coastal erosion due to sea level rise, and it expressly sought to accomplish
“a gradual retreat from the [beach sand dune] system over a forty-year
period.”78 To that end, the law prohibited new construction on the seaward
side of a line representing the most landward point of erosion in the
previous 40 years and subjected areas on the landward side of that line to
a set of regulations governing the size and setback of new buildings.79 The
Court held that depriving the plaintiff of all the economic value of his
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yIuaO6 [https://perma.cc/D5G8XJ8G].
75. See Lemann, supra note 69, at 196–200 (describing shortcomings of
NFIP’s lender mandate). In Orleans Parish, which includes the urban areas of the
city of New Orleans as well as the particularly low-lying and heavily flooded
suburban area of New Orleans East, only 40% of homeowners had flood insurance
before Hurricane Katrina. Id. at 199. A related problem is the program’s reliance on
the “100-year flood” as its statistical fulcrum. Id. at 180–81. Properties located in
areas that have less than a one percent chance of flooding in any given year are not
required to carry flood insurance. The recent flooding in Louisiana demonstrated
the problem with this approach; much of the damage was in areas that had only a
0.2% or even 0.1% chance of flooding in any given year. See Edward P. Richards,
Why Was the Louisiana Flood of August 2016 So Severe?, LSU LAW CTR.
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2016), https://sites.law
.lsu.edu/coast/2016/08/why-was-the-louisiana-flood-of-august-2016-so-severe/
[https://perma.cc/W453-ZDR3].
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
78. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 275. The state’s first effort to regulate
coastal development, which included the creation of the South Carolina Coastal
Council, came in 1977 in response to the federal CZMA. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
79. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 275.
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property constituted a taking and thus triggered the state’s obligation to
compensate him.80 Lucas is broadly understood to mean that states cannot
“baldly prohibit all new development in upland areas judged likely to be
submerged by future sea-level rise without likely involving the payment
of compensation.”81
Lucas suggested one possible solution: a state law that denies a
property owner all beneficial use of land does not constitute a taking if
background principles of property and nuisance law would also bar use of
the property.82 One of those background principles is the public trust
doctrine, which treats traditional public rights to land as inherent in any
private title to it.83 Many states recognize a right of public access to tidal
areas, and in some cases this right extends to dry beaches above high-tide
lines.84 As sea levels rise, private land thus can become subject to the
public trust without the state having to effect a taking.85 Innovative forms
of zoning like rolling easements allow building restrictions to move inland
as oceans do.86 Still, this approach allows governments to enforce retreat
only after sea level rise has made it a fait accompli; prohibiting development
in areas that will be inundated in the future, or are above sea level but
subject to high risk of flooding during storms, still runs afoul of Lucas.87
The expense of having to pay compensation is not the only barrier to
proactive retreat; it is simply unpopular,88 and because of the decentralized
and intensely local nature of land-use regulation,89 meaningful proactive
retreat would require an incredible exercise of foresight and selfabnegation. Many communities in particularly risky locations are
extremely small and would have to essentially will themselves out of
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change: Lawyers
Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521, 548–58 (2013).
82. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
83. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 276.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 278–81.
87. Id.; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
88. See Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 349 (“Perhaps more than any other
obstacle, it is the political opposition to meaningful restrictions on coastal land
use that limits the effectiveness of attempts to initiate a retreat from coastal
floodplains.”).
89. See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice
on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 256, 268 (1993) (noting that
beachfront property owners are “relatively concentrated in a geographic area
[and] have a clear common interest in protecting [their] community and property”
and thus will have an increased “ability to act effectively as an interest group”).
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existence to retreat from the flood risk they face. There are countless
examples, but Tangier Island in Chesapeake Bay is a good one. After
decades of slow population decline, the island is currently home to about
400 people, and it will be virtually underwater by the end of the century.90
Still, rather than picking up and leaving, the town is lobbying the federal
government to spend tens of millions of dollars constructing an elaborate
system of fortifications that will protect it, at least temporarily.91 Even
state governments have a hard time putting the long-term interests of their
populations ahead of the intense short-term interests of people who live on
the coasts.92
The perennial unpopularity of even purely voluntary buyouts is
another illustration of the problem. Voluntary public acquisition of floodprone properties has the dual benefits of being politically palatable and
achieving permanent removal of structures from floodplains, leading some
commentators to hail it as the only floodplain management technique that
offers a real chance of success.93 Indeed, buyout efforts do have a history
of achievement, most notably in the wake of the 1993 flooding on the
Mississippi River, which led to the relocation of two towns.94 Still, buyouts
are costly in the short term,95 and participation rates are often
disappointing.96 There are ways in which existing buyout programs could
90. Gertner, supra note 58.
91. See id.
92. The experience of the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission is
a vivid cautionary tale. In 2010, the Commission’s science panel studied the
problem of sea level rise and concluded that the ocean along the State’s coast
could rise anywhere from 15 to 55 inches by 2100. It then recommended that the
State adopt a figure of 39 inches for planning purposes, and the Commission
drafted a policy ordering coastal counties to use that figure in evaluating private
development and public infrastructure projects. The backlash was intense.
Officials in the Outer Banks, which would be virtually erased by 39 inches of sea
level rise, successfully lobbied state lawmakers to set aside the Commission’s
forecast and look 30 years into the future instead, estimating only eight inches of
sea level rise during that time period. See Lori Montgomery, On N.C.’s Outer
Banks, Scary Climate-Change Predictions Prompt a Change of Forecast, WASH.
POST (June 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ncsouter-banks-got-a-scary-forecast-about-climate-change-so/2014/06/24/0042cf96
-f6f3-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html [https://perma.cc/5VJN-SF2B].
93. Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 350; Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10344.
94. Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 351. For a discussion of these relocation
efforts, see infra Part III.B.1.
95. Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 351.
96. Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10343 (“Participation rates in buyout
programs have historically been very low.”); NJ Eyes Nearly 700 Homes for Post-
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be strengthened and the process for participating in them streamlined that
offer some hope of further success.97 For example, several commentators
have developed creative ways of making buyouts cheaper98 or more
appealing,99 but these proposals involve paying far less than current
market price for individuals’ homes or making affordable flood insurance
conditional on agreeing to a buyout in the event of a future flood.
Unfortunately, the current political climate offers little reason to expect
that such measures are likely to win broad support.100
Most commentators agree that none of the existing measures for
encouraging retreat are up to the gargantuan task ahead.101 As two scholars
concluded, “retreat is at present mostly a legal theory.”102 Absent a
concerted policy, retreat is likely to occur in a scattered, piecemeal fashion,
as individual residents reach their own tipping points at which coastal living
is no longer palatable. Atlantic City, one of the many places already
experiencing the first signs of inundation,103 provides a glimpse of what
this future might look like. Buffeted by economic problems, the city is
experiencing a “slow death” at the hands of sea level rise, featuring
“sporadic super storms[,] routine nuisance flooding, crumbling
infrastructure, and endemic poverty” as damaged homes are gradually
Sandy Buyouts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.nj.com/news
/index.ssf/2014/04/nj_eyes_nearly_700_homes_for_post-sandy_buyouts.html
(noting that officials were not targeting worst-hit, shorefront communities
because there are “very few willing sellers in these towns”) [https://perma.cc
/LU4R-X8ZL].
97. Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10343.
98. Barnhizer argues for “givings recapture” in the calculation of just
compensation for condemned property. This would entail reducing a property’s
market value by the value of the government subsidies the market value implicitly
includes, such as subsidized flood insurance, flood control structures, and any
other benefits “directly traceable to past government flood responses.” See
Barnhizer, supra note 52, at 354–72.
99. Hayat and Moore argue that the NFIP should offer homeowners reduced
flood insurance rates in exchange for a commitment to relocate in the event of a
serious flood. Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10344–47.
100. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10340 (“[The] NFIP, as
currently implemented, is ill-prepared to deal with the reality that flood risk is
increasing in response to climate change and that billions of dollars’ worth of
properties will become uninhabitable by the end of the century.”).
102. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268.
103. Michael Edison Hayden, Atlantic City Gambles on Rising Seas, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (May 4, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/160
502-rising-seas-climate-change-atlantic-city/ [https://perma.cc/5UFH-L992].
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abandoned, eroding the city’s tax base and making life ever more
untenable for those left behind.104
Indeed, retreat policies have so far been implemented almost exclusively
reactively rather than proactively.105 Thanks to a host of cognitive biases, the
risk of flooding never appears so great as when a flood has just occurred.106
The period after disasters also frequently strikes planners and officials as an
opportune time to revisit things like patterns of settlement and infrastructure
investments, as recreating the status quo requires an affirmative decision to
invest.107 The result is that, from a policy perspective, post-disaster retreat can
appear to be the lowest-hanging fruit. Many experts have offered proposals
that aim not to move people away from flood zones in tranquil times, but

104. Id.; see also Virginia Eubanks, My Drowning City Is a Harbinger of
Climate Slums to Come: Federal Legislation Is Hastening the Collapse of Working
Class Neighborhoods Near Water, NATION (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.thenation
.com/article/low-water-mark/ (describing effects of “climate redlining” in Troy,
New York) [https://perma.cc/L4E9-KHQ2]; Ian Urbina, Perils of Climate Change
Could Swamp Coastal Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2gj7
AT6 [https://perma.cc/Z2ED-E78X].
105. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268–69.
106. The “availability heuristic” suggests that risks that are easily called to
mind, perhaps because they have recently been realized, are often overestimated.
See Meyer, supra note 52, at 158–59. This effect has been observed in studies of
people’s responses to natural disasters. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer,
Changes in and Generalization of Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences
with Stressful Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earthquake, 18
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1992). Indeed, participation in
the NFIP spikes after floods. Mark J. Browne & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for
Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence, 20 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 291, 291
(2000). Another important cognitive bias affecting perception of disaster risk is
the tendency to believe that the overall statistical likelihood of an event will be
represented over a short sample of time, which leads to the underestimation of the
risk of floods during quiet periods and overestimation during busy periods. Meyer,
supra note 52, at 160.
107. See, e.g., Cite Editorial Committee, A Path Forward to Rebuild Houston
Post-Harvey, HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.houstonchronicle.com
/opinion/outlook/article/Cite-A-path-forward-to-rebuild-Houston-12168352.php
(calling for relocation of those who lived in Houston’s flood zones)
[https://perma.cc/52M9-HU2N]; Judith Browne-Dianis & Anita Sinha, Exiling
the Poor: The Clash of Redevelopment and Fair Housing in Post-Katrina New
Orleans, 51 HOW. L.J. 481 (2008) (describing decision to demolish New Orleans’
public housing projects in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).
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rather to put in place mechanisms that will force people to abandon their
homes in the wake of floods.108
The trouble with this approach is vividly illustrated by the experience
of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. As the city’s dramatic failure to
implement the retreat envisioned by the green dot map shows,109 the period
after a major flood is one freighted with emotion, and both individual
victims and the officials who represent them have a tendency to treat
returning and rebuilding as an act of deep significance. Although some
victims may react to being flooded with resignation and resettle elsewhere,
the dominant post-disaster tone is often one of defiance, anger, and
determination to rebuild.110 In these environments, proposals to mandate
retreat are often not welcomed, to put it mildly.111 The following Part
offers a new way of understanding this reaction.
II. THE IMPULSE TO REBUILD
What the dominant policy prescriptions ignore is what makes them so
hard to implement: being flooded in a catastrophic event triggers a set of
emotional responses that often lead to an intense, frequently adversarial
desire to rebuild. These responses are complex and usually heavily
dependent on facts unique to the particular area and storm at issue.
Nevertheless, the impulse to rebuild can be understood at least in part as
consisting of a set of sometimes overlapping reactions. First, rebuilding
can be an act of revenge in roughly the way a tort suit can be an act of
revenge. Second, rebuilding can be a form of culture, an expression of a
commitment to a particular way of life and community. Third, rebuilding
can be an act of resistance in that it defies and undoes the harm resulting
from governmental failures to prevent flooding.

108. See, e.g., Hayat & Moore, supra note 53, at 10344–47; Barnhizer, supra
note 52, at 368; David A. Lewis, The Relocation of Development from Coastal
Hazards through Publicly Funded Acquisition Programs: Examples and Lessons
from the Gulf Coast, 5 SEA GRANT L. AND POL’Y J. 98, 100 (2012).
109. See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Donze, Let Us Decide, supra note 14; Coral Davenport &
Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate Refugees’, N.Y. TIMES
(May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-the-firstamerican-climate-refugees.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/9WFT-GSMG].
111. See infra notes 209–221
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A. Recovery as Revenge
Like a tort, a flood causes a disruption in a preexisting normative
equilibrium, triggering a desire for correction, a need to get even. Getting
even is not simply retribution—hurting one who has hurt you—but a
performance that seeks to correct the way in which a wrong affects the
normative position of its victim. Floods, however, are torts without
tortfeasors, and this fact changes the way revenge is taken. Instead of forcing
a tortfeasor to pay his victim, flood victims avenge themselves by
rebuilding, often reflexively and in a way that is emotionally and rhetorically
charged. Policies that ignore this aspect of rebuilding in favor of forced
relocation set themselves up for failure. Just as the tort system provides a
necessary avenue of recourse in a society that has banned violent retribution,
the revenge analogy suggests that disaster victims should be provided with
some avenue of recourse against the storms that have wronged them.
1. Revenge in Tort Theory
Scholars have long detected in tort law strong glimmers of the concept
of revenge. Indeed, tort is often treated as a substitute for revenge.112 In his
analysis of the mechanism by which tort law substitutes for revenge, Scott
Hershovitz examines three possible versions of the idea. First, tort law
might be a kind of bribe, paid by the government to induce people to
forego the messy and unpleasant business of taking personal vengeance
against those people who have wronged them.113 A second version of the
substitution of tort for revenge sees a tort suit as a kind of revenge in and
of itself. On this account, tort damages are primarily a way of inflicting
harm on a wrongdoer in the same way as an act of vengeance does.114 A
third possibility, one espoused by Hershovitz, is that both tort law and
revenge are tools for accomplishing the same thing: corrective justice.115
In claiming that tort law is a substitute for revenge because both
achieve corrective justice, Hershovitz advances a particular version of
corrective justice, one that differs in significant ways from the classical
112. See supra note 34.
113. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 87 (noting that tort damages are sometimes
seen as “a payoff to prevent private violence”).
114. Id. at 4; Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1387. For Sherwin, the damages
available in tort law—even those not explicitly labeled “punitive”—frequently
diverge from what is necessary to compensate the plaintiff and thus can be
explained only as a way of “provid[ing] satisfaction to the victims of legal
wrongs.” Id. at 1389.
115. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 89.

2017]

STRONGER THAN THE STORM

459

Aristotelian model.116 For Hershovitz, corrective justice is not, per
Aristotle, about making plaintiffs “whole” by undoing wrongful transactions
and thus returning them to the position they would have been in had the wrong
not occurred.117 Instead of the “make whole” metaphor, which he notes is a
product of the mid-nineteenth century,118 Hershovitz suggests a return to the
older notion that tort damages offer the plaintiff “satisfaction,” with the
“animating metaphor” of tort law being “getting even.”119 Instead of
attempting to restore a preexisting allocation of goods, getting even is about
restoring an equality of status and social standing.120
Revenge is also a way of getting even. In revenge cultures, the focus
was on impermissible behavior and what one party’s treatment of another
said about their relative positions. As Hershovitz puts it, “you may do unto
others as they do unto you.”121 Revenge cultures thus did not permit just
any act of retributive violence against a wrongdoer but rather a particular
response carefully calibrated to be proportional to the wrong and allow the
victim to get even.122 Drawing on work by Bill Miller, Hershovitz relates
some of the workings of the system of lex talionis123 in medieval Iceland.124
In that society, proportional violent retribution was a backstop designed to
encourage the payment of compensation to the victim.125 A “plaintiff” got
even by demanding from a “tortfeasor” the amount of money the tortfeasor
would be willing to pay to avoid having the same harm inflicted upon
him.126 If the parties could not agree on the price, they would resort to a
116. Id. at 89–90.
117. Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 117 (2011). Hershovitz’s problem with this account is
that it simply is too far afield from what is practically possible in the vast majority
of cases. When plaintiffs have suffered any kind of emotional or physical harm,
awards of money damages do not serve to return them to the status quo ante. In
fact, they fall so far short of that goal that there must be a different sense in which
they are doing corrective justice. Id. at 116–17.
118. Id. at 118 (citing John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages:
Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 447–62 (2006)).
119. Id.
120. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 95.
121. Id.
122. Hershovitz, supra note 117, at 122–23.
123. Lex Talionis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The law of
retaliation, under which punishment should be in kind—an eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth, and so on—but no more”).
124. Hershovitz, supra note 117, at 122–23 (citing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE
FOR AN EYE 49–51 (2006)).
125. Id. at 123.
126. Id.
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neutral third party, the “oddman,” who would render a decision,
“prevent[ing] getting even from getting out of hand by selling both parties
on a plausible conception of evenness.”127
Despite courts’ and commentators’ frequent invocation of the
“making whole” language, the metaphor of getting even arguably fits more
comfortably as a descriptive account of our modern tort system. Viewed
in this light, there are two features of tort law that come into sharp relief.
First, the adjudication of a tort case is a performance, and the degree to
which tort suits offer justice is a function of whether the performance is
successful.128 Second, and relatedly, the success of the tort system in doing
justice for those who have been wronged is measured by the messages it
sends. For those scholars who emphasize the role of revenge in tort law,
the wrongs with which tort concerns itself are not only, or even chiefly,
about misallocation of goods but also about shifts in the status of the
parties. A tort that is left unaddressed implies that the tortfeasor may
permissibly treat his victim in a certain way, lowering the victim’s social
standing in the community.129 By finding the tortfeasor liable and
awarding damages, society corrects that message, marking the tortfeasor’s
treatment of his victim as impermissible and restoring the victim to his
status as a person deserving of a certain standard of treatment.130 Indeed,
127. MILLER, supra note 124, at 9.
128. Hershovitz, supra note 117, at 125 (“Whether courts succeed in doing
justice depends on whether people regard the remedies awarded as sufficient to
render prevailing plaintiffs even.”). Revenge, too, was a performance, one that
could be effective even when it did not result in the wrongdoer’s injury. In a duel,
the parties often deliberately fired in such a way as to miss each other, an
acknowledgement that the public act of each party being vulnerable to the other’s
deadly force was enough to reestablish their equality, without either of them
needing to die. See Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and
Social Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1809 n.113, 1824
n.156 (2001).
129. Hershovitz, supra note 34, at 94 (“[T]he threat is to your social standing,
which is diminished if people think it was okay to treat you that way . . . .”).
Hershovitz here relies on Pamela Hieronymi, Articulating an Uncompromising
Forgiveness, 62 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 529, 546
(2001) (“I suggest that a past wrong against you, standing in your history without
apology, atonement, retribution, punishment, restitution, condemnation, or
anything else that might recognize it as a wrong, makes a claim. It says, in effect,
that you can be treated this way, and that such treatment is acceptable.”).
130. Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1389 (“[T]he object of compensatory remedies
is not simply to adjust the absolute position of the claimant, but also to adjust an
outcome in which the relative positions of the claimant and the wrongdoer are
deemed to be unfair.”); id. at 1397 (“The outcome of the remedy is not simply a
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the link between tort law and revenge has led many scholars to see tort law
as a necessary aspect of government in a society that has outlawed private
acts of vengeance.131
2. Against Nature: Revenge in the Disaster Context
It may seem odd to speak of taking revenge against an unthinking,
unfeeling meteorological phenomenon of limited duration, such as a
hurricane. And in a basic sense it is of course true that victims cannot
inflict harm on natural disasters in retribution for the harm the disasters
have inflicted on them. There is nevertheless a sense in which the human
response to natural disasters is characterized by a vehement emotional
reaction that bears a strong resemblance to certain aspects of revenge.
Hurricanes are like tortfeasors in that they inflict harm on victims in ways
that are perceived as unjust. Like torts, these harms are about more than
just the allocation of losses. They are also about status and equality and
the particular messages that uncompensated losses send about the status of
those people who bear them. Lacking an institution like tort law that
provides an avenue of recourse against the storms that have wronged them,
disaster victims, like tort victims in the days before the development of
tort law, are left to take matters into their own hands.132 This they do by
rebuilding.
correction of loss, but an adjustment in the comparative positions of the parties.”);
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64
MD. L. REV. 364, 369 (2005) (arguing that features of negligence law that can be
seen as “remnants of primitive notions of vengeance” express values that “link up
in deep ways to basic principles of liberty and democratic equality” and that by
empowering individuals to seek redress from those who wrong them, tort law
“affirms the notion that each of us is equal in owing and being owed various
obligations by others”).
131. See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 541; Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1399;
Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27
HARV. L. REV. 195, 198–202 (1914).
132. Plaintiffs have made various attempts to hold more traditional entities
responsible for the harms they have experienced in floods exacerbated by climate
change. Property owners in Mississippi and Alaska have sued fossil fuel companies,
seeking to hold them responsible for contributing to the harms of hurricanes and sea
level rise, respectively, but both suits were dismissed. See Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (reinstating district court decision dismissing
case on standing and political question grounds); Native Vill. of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). It is possible that the legal
system’s inability to assign blame for the harms of such events contributes to the
sense that nature itself is the only appropriate target of victims’ ire.
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The rhetoric of revenge is often pervasive in the wake of disasters.
Public responses by elected officials, media, and victims frequently
portray storms as “enemies” that “assault” and “attack” their victims,
leaving in their wake devastation that is often compared to a “war zone.”133
In New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it was not uncommon
to see graffiti addressed to Hurricane Katrina itself, often referring to the
storm as a “bitch” and pledging to return to the city, as if that would
frustrate the storm.134 Messages of defiance were displayed around the
city: a popular, locally owned barbershop put a banner above its entrance
reading “NO SURRENDER! OPEN.”135 Survey data suggests that this
sentiment was not limited to graffiti. Just over a year after Hurricane
Katrina, the Kaiser Family Foundation conducted a door-to-door survey
of more than 1,500 randomly selected people in various parts of New
Orleans to solicit their views on the impacts of Hurricane Katrina and the
rebuilding process.136 Seventy-five percent of respondents said that lowlying areas of the city destroyed by Hurricane Katrina should be rebuilt,
133. Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 221–25
(2013). Pidot quotes comments by Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin after
Hurricane Irene—“I kind of felt like I was coming out of a war zone”—and New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg after Hurricane Sandy—“To describe it as
looking like pictures we have seen at the end of World War II is not overstating
it.” Id. at 224. Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Andersen Jones, Disaggregating
Disasters, 60 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 884, 916 n.157 (2013) (noting remarks by General
Russell Honore, commander of the federal military response to Hurricane Katrina,
calling the “hurricane itself ‘an enemy that pulled a classic military maneuver,
speeding toward land with overwhelming force.’”); Sarah E. Jenkins, What
Happens Next: Metaphor in Disaster Recovery Policy, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 151,
161–62 (2015) (noting Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour’s comparison of
Hurricane Katrina’s destruction to destruction of Hiroshima and Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco’s analogy to the reconstruction of Europe after World
War II in testimony before Congress).
134. See, e.g., James Johnson, Aggregates Unseen: Imagining Post-Katrina
New Orleans, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 659, 664–65 (2012) (“Hey Katrina!!
That’s all you got? You big sissy!!! We will be back!!!”); id. (“Katrina is a bitch”);
GETTY IMAGES, http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/video/new-orleans-residentpainted-this-katrina-you-bitch-we-news-footage/475166500 (last visited Nov. 12,
2017) (“Katrina you bitch we will survive.”) [https://perma.cc/5Q7C-KTBN];
WORD ON THE STREET, https://wordsonthestreet.files.wordpress.com/2010/10
/401242171_6a0f404796_b_d.jpg (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“I survived Betsy
but Katrina was a bitch.”) [https://perma.cc/26G7-CD9N].
135. Campanella, “Bring Your Own Chairs”, supra note 16, at 28.
136. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., GIVING VOICE TO THE PEOPLE OF NEW ORLEANS:
THE POST-KATRINA BASELINE SURVEY (May 2007), http://kff.org/medicaid/pollfinding/report-giving-voice-to-the-people-of/ [https://perma.cc/Z3FH-F5C4].
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and 95% said that the region’s levee system should be rebuilt stronger than
it had been before.137 Eighty-six percent of respondents said they were
planning to remain in the area.138
Similar messages appeared after Hurricane Sandy, instructing the storm
to “shove it”139 and “rot in hell.”140 Indeed, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Sandy, the state of New Jersey commissioned a series of ads with the slogan
“Stronger Than The Storm,” which featured shots of the Jersey shore in a
state of placid normalcy, as well as citizens planting flags with the slogan
“Stronger Than The Storm” into the sand on pristine beaches.141 In a
sentiment echoed along the coast, the mayor of Sea Bright, New Jersey, a
small town on a barrier island that had seen its entire business district wiped
out and three quarters of its population rendered homeless, immediately
rejected any suggestion of retreat. “We’re not retreating,” she said: “[i]t is
antithetical to the [New] Jersey mindset, and particularly to the Sea Bright
mindset. We’re known for being strong, for being resilient, for not backing
down.”142

137. Id. at 5, 25 (asking whether respondents supported rebuilding the levee
system to withstand a Category 5 hurricane; it had previously been designed to
withstand only a Category 3 storm).
138. Id.
139. Jennifer H. Cunningham et al., Hurricane Sandy Starts to Hit: First
Outages as Rain Arrives and Wind Picks Up in New York City, Streets are Empty
After Subway Closure, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://www.ny
dailynews.com/new-york/gov-mta-suspend-subway-bus-rail-service-article-1.1194
081 (photograph depicting woman painting graffiti onto her boarded-up house:
“Shove It Sandy”) [https://perma.cc/QRY4-K64W?safari=1].
140. Ned Berke, Blame Obama for Sandy? Someone Seems to Think So,
SHEEPSHEAD BITES (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.sheepsheadbites.com/2012/11 /blame
-obama-for-sandy-someone-seems-to-think-so/ (showing photograph depicting
graffiti on destroyed wall that said “Rot in Hell Sandy” alongside a drawing of a
hand with middle finger extended) [https://perma.cc/9554-KK3D].
141. See New Jersey: Stronger than the Storm TV Commercial, supra note 32.
An official comment accompanying the State’s official YouTube video declares
that “[w]e’re resilient, we’re Jersey-tough, we are Stronger than the Storm.” Id.
The ad campaign caused a minor political scandal, as it was funded with federal
relief money and yet prominently featured Governor Chris Christie, who at the
time was running for reelection. See Alec MacGillis, The Chris Christie Scandal
Just Got Worse, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 18, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article
/117066/christies-stronger-storm-jersey-shore-post-sandy-ad-cover [https://perma
.cc/TM 6Z-UFYY].
142. Should Worst-Flooded Areas Be Left after Sandy?, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2013/01/should
_worst-flooded_areas_be.html [https://perma.cc/PYX6-BTJN].
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For many people, the rhetoric itself is the problem. On this view,
treating “nature and humans [as] involved in a conflict in which nature is
an enemy that must be resisted”143 leads to “a ‘knee-jerk reaction . . . to
rebuild the same roads and bridges that existed before and bigger, more
expensive homes.’”144 As in cases of war or terrorism, failing to rebuild
after disasters thus is rhetorically framed as a failure, a defeat. This makes
moving out of harm’s way impossible: “The rhetoric of conflict forecloses,
or at least renders more difficult, decisions to rebuild in more sensible,
safer locations because, in the narrative of armed conflict, such [a]
response represents capitulation and retreat.”145 The link between the
rhetoric and the desire to rebuild seems obvious enough; if disasters are
the enemy and the enemy wants to destroy people, then it is only natural
that victims want to resist the enemy by foiling its plans. For those focused
on rhetoric, the solution is simple: change the rhetoric.146
Adopting this kind of adversarial personification in the face of
hardship feels beguilingly natural, and yet it is worth asking why this way
of thinking and speaking is so common. Why does it occur to victims to
143. Pidot, supra note 133, at 230; Sun & Jones, supra note 133, at 915
(“[W]ar rhetoric today plays an increasingly prominent role in the narrative of
both natural and technological disaster response.”); see also Frederick L. Bates &
Walter G. Peacock, Disaster and Social Change, in SOCIOLOGY OF DISASTERS:
CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO DISASTER RESEARCH 291, 291 (Russell R.
Dynes et al. eds., 1987).
144. Pidot, supra note 133, at 234.
145. Id. at 235; see also Sun & Jones, supra note 133, at 925 n.210 (“[T]reating
disasters as a war against nature . . . may encourage society to focus on disaster
mitigation measures that attempt to control or subjugate nature rather than those
measures that respect natural forces and try to limit population growth in the most
dangerous locales.”); Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268 (“Because the
negative connotations associated with the term ‘retreat’ might make implementing
these types of policies politically difficult, policymakers may also want to
consider relabeling it.”).
146. See Jenkins, supra note 133, at 151, 176 (arguing for a shift away from
the metaphor of war and conflict and towards a metaphor of resilience in postdisaster recovery); Pidot, supra note 133, at 256 (“Political leaders should also
consider the language they use in discussing disaster . . . . Emphasizing the human
role in creating circumstances in which natural events can lead to devastation may
facilitate more rational development policy.”); Sun & Jones, supra note 133, at
948 (“Now is the time to use this new awareness of the conflation of war and
disaster to critically assess the tone and language used to convey disaster
information and policy . . . .”); Byrne & Grannis, supra note 24, at 268 (“Because
the negative connotations associated with the term ‘retreat’ might make
implementing these types of policies politically difficult, policymakers may also
want to consider relabeling it.”).
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refer to weather patterns as autonomous enemies, express a desire to harm
them, or talk as if rebuilding our homes will represent a kind of victory
over them? One part of the explanation may simply be that anger is a
natural reaction to traumatic events, and when trauma is caused by
disasters, victims’ sense of anger finds its outlet in the unthinking forces
of nature.147 Another part of the answer lies in the difference between
revenge as it is typically understood and revenge as a form of corrective
justice. The point is not so much to inflict pain, or to shift losses, as it is to
correct the message sent by the wrongful act about the relative status of
the parties. When people treat hurricanes as enemies and vow to beat them,
they are not trying to harm the hurricane so much as they are trying to
repair the harm they have visited upon the victims.148
Therefore, correcting the harm often involves more than just
recreating a set of physical goods that existed before the storm. Just as tort
suits can serve to correct the messages sent by the wrongs that prompt
them, the act of rebuilding one’s home helps correct a message sent by the
destruction of a flood. A flood can be an insult, like a tort. Homes were
destroyed, the flood implies, because they were not worthy of being
protected, or perhaps because they were constructed poorly or in areas that
were foolish to inhabit in the first place.149 Perhaps their owners were not
147. The Department of Veterans Affairs’ National Center for Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder notes that “trauma can be connected with anger in many ways”:
“After a trauma, you might think that what happened to you was unfair or unjust.
You might not understand why the event happened and why it happened to you.
These thoughts can result in intense anger.” Common Reactions After Trauma,
NAT’L CTR FOR PTSD TRAUMA, U.S. DEPT. OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, https://www
.ptsd.va.gov/public/problems/common-reactions-after-trauma.asp (last visited
Sept. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RG8D-2THD].
148. Like corrective justice theorists, those scholars who study disaster
recovery frequently speak in terms of “repair” and often see rebuilding as an act
involving repair of more than just physical damage. See Kevin Rozario, Making
Progress: Disaster Narratives and the Art of Optimism in America, in THE
RESILIENT CITY: HOW MODERN CITIES RECOVER FROM DISASTER 27 (Lawrence
J. Vale & Thomas J. Campanella eds., 2005) (“When offices, stores, and homes
are suddenly and unexpectedly annihilated, it is necessary not only to manufacture
new material structures but also to repair torn cultural fabrics and damaged
psyches.”).
149. See, e.g., Richard Reeves, Hurricane$, Earthquake$ and Flood$: If
People Want to Build Their Houses in Dangerous Places, Why Should the Rest of
Us Pay When Disaster Strikes?, 26 WASH. MONTHLY 10 (1994) (arguing, in the
wake of the Northridge earthquake, against the idea that “taxpayers [should]
subsidize Californians and other folks rich enough, lucky enough, or foolish
enough to live at water’s edge or in the picturesque path of fire, mudslide, or
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foresighted or resourceful enough to take precautions that would have
saved their homes or their loved ones.150 The destruction of a flood
suggests and reinforces all of these narratives.
Rebuilding, like revenge, counters these messages. By rebuilding,
victims assert that they are indeed stronger than the storm. They assert that
they have the fortitude, resources, and self-sufficiency to overcome
hardship. They assert that their homes, communities, and lives are no less
worthy of consideration than those of the unharmed and that we all might
in fact be equal. The alternative—retreat—is indeed a form of defeat. And
defeat hurts not just because it involves the giving up of a tangible thing—
territory, one’s home—but because it tells the defeated that they are less
than the victors: less strong, less determined, less resourceful, less
deserving of respect.151 By rebuilding, individuals complete a narrative arc
that places disasters in the middle of a redemptive story that ends with
opportunity and progress, rather than at the end of a tragic story that ends
with loss and death.152
The messaging works on the level of community as well. By
rebuilding, communities insist that they are capable, resilient, resourceful,
and strong and that they possess these qualities in measures equal to or
exceeding other, drier communities. All of these ideas are frequently made
explicit. The narrative of triumphant rebirth has long been a major part of
the civic consciousness in cities destroyed by disasters. Chicago and San
tremors”); see also M. Justin Davis & T. Nathaniel French, Blaming Victims and
Survivors: An Analysis of Post-Katrina Print News Coverage, 73 SOUTHERN
COMMC’N J. 243, 249–51 (2008) (“[N]ews coverage repeatedly presumed that the
people of New Orleans had detailed, prior knowledge of the dangers that
hurricanes pose to the Gulf Coast region.”).
150. See Karen E. Belinky, Letter to the Editor, Toll of Riding Out Storm, USA
TODAY, Sept. 25, 2005, at 20A (“Every U.S. News Agency repeatedly told
residents within reach of the storm that Katrina would likely cause catastrophic
damage. Yet it appears that through sheer ignorance or foolish bravado, many
residents . . . decided that mandatory evacuation notices didn’t apply to them.
Now they’re sitting on rooftops . . . expecting emergency personnel to risk their
lives to save them. Is this the definition of complete selfishness or simple
stupidity?”); see also Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame:
Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 462–
68 (2006) (collecting additional examples).
151. Alice Fothergill, Enrique G.M. Maestas & JoAnne DeRouen Darlington,
Race, Ethnicity and Disasters in the United States: A Review of the Literature, 23
DISASTERS 156, 164 (1999) (“Many minorities had greater difficulties recovering
[from disasters] due to lower incomes, fewer savings, greater unemployment, less
insurance, and less access to communication channels and information.”).
152. Rozario, supra note 148, at 33–34.
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Francisco are notable American examples.153 Although modern citizens
are perhaps less willing to overlook the death toll of disasters in treating
them as opportunities for new beginnings, the instinct to see recovery as
an affirmative demonstration of a city’s pluck and grit remains.154
Just as rebuilding in the wake of disaster conveys a set of corrective
messages, forbidding rebuilding carries messages of its own. In foreclosing
rebuilding, the government prevents its citizens from correcting a harm they
have experienced and prevents them from making the implicit claims about
equality, self-sufficiency, and autonomy that rebuilding represents. Like an
insult that stands unwithdrawn and unaddressed, the damage wrought by the
storm remains. When governments attempt to prevent rebuilding, they are
asserting, often explicitly, that flooded residents should never have lived
where they lived, even if they did so for generations. When governments
close off certain areas, they are signaling that they view those communities
as a drag on the resources of the broader polity that is not justified by the
benefit they provide by being there. The implicit message is that
communities that should not come back are expendable and that the larger
city, region, or state would be better off without them.
B. Recovery as Culture
Rebuilding also expresses certain attitudes about risk and culture,
attitudes that often strike very deep emotional chords. In work that
reconceptualizes the ways in which individuals respond to risk, often
referred to as “cultural cognition theory,” Dan Kahan has identified three
models for understanding our reactions to the risks we face.155 Under the
“rational weigher theory,” individuals process information about risk
dispassionately and then use that information to make utility-maximizing
decisions.156 The “irrational weigher theory,” by contrast, begins with the

153. See generally id.
154. The cover of the report commissioned by the New York City mayor’s
office to develop plans for increasing the city’s resiliency in the face of climate
change contains a definition of “resilient”: “1. Able to bounce back after change
or adversity. 2. Capable of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from
difficult conditions. Syn: TOUGH. See also: New York City.” N.Y.C. SPECIAL
INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT
NEW YORK 2 (June 11, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report
.shtml [https://perma.cc/CYS6-RDW7].
155. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 745
156. Id. The rational weigher theory, a central feature of neoclassical
economics, sees no role for emotion in risk cognition, beyond the notion that
individuals can be risk averse in varying degrees. Id. at 746. Thanks to the
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premise that people are not capable of accurately evaluating the risks they
face in everyday life and instead are subject to a variety of emotions and
cognitive shortcuts that distort their perception of risk in certain
predictable ways.157 The irrational weigher theory treats these distortions
as irrational and suboptimal in the sense that they lead people to make
decisions that they would not make were they in possession of accurate
assessments of the risks they face.158
In contrast to the rational and irrational weigher theories, Kahan offers
the “cultural evaluator theory.”159 Of central importance to the cultural
evaluator theory is the idea that our responses to risk are expressive rather
than simply rational or irrational. For Kahan, “when an individual is
assessing what position to take on a putatively dangerous activity, she is . . .
not weighing (rationally or irrationally) her expected utility but rather
evaluating the social meaning of that activity.”160 By selecting which risks to
engage in, individuals are thus “adopting stances towards states of affairs that
appropriately express the values that define their identities.”161 Emotions are
seen not as clouding what might otherwise be rational assessments of risk but
as “enabling individuals to perceive what stance toward risks coheres with
their values,”162 which is based on the social meaning of behaviors and is
“unlikely to be tied in any systematic way to the actuarial magnitude of those
risks.”163
contributions of behavioral economics, the rational weigher theory has been largely
debunked to the extent that it purports to describe the behavior of actual human
beings. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–85 (1998).
157. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 746–48.
158. Id. at 748 (“The point,” for the irrational weigher theory, “isn’t merely
that emotion-pervaded reasoning is less accurate than cooler, calculative
reasoning; rather it’s that habitual submission to its emotional logic ultimately
displaces reflective thinking, inducing ‘behavioral responses that depart from
what individuals view as the best course of action’—or at least would view as best
if their judgment were not impaired.” (quoting George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk
as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 271 (2001))). For the irrational weigher
theory, our responses to risk are a problem; the solution to which is the “delegation
of regulatory authority to politically insulated, scientifically trained risk experts”
who are capable of putting in place rules that “form[] [individuals’] conduct to the
preferences they would hold . . . if they had the cognitive capacity to form
considered and rational beliefs.” Id. at 761.
159. Id. at 748.
160. Id. at 749.
161. Id. at 748–49.
162. Id. at 750.
163. Id. at 754.
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Cultural cognition theory sees battles over regulatory interventions
aimed at managing risk not as simple disagreements over optimal social
policy capable of being resolved by data but rather as fundamental
conflicts between competing worldviews.164 Debates over gun control
illustrate the point nicely. Kahan sees those people who generally oppose
gun control as “individualist[s]” for whom “being rendered defenseless”
is far worse than simply being exposed to some risk of getting shot.165 Such
people are, for Kahan, “not so much afraid of dying as afraid of death
without honor.”166 Opposing groups that do not share the same cultural
values thus often end up talking past each other when debating the
appropriate response to risk: “If part of what disturbs (some) people about
gun control is the condition of servility it expresses to cede protection of
themselves and their families exclusively to the state,” Kahan asks, “how
responsive is it to print out a regression analysis that shows more lives are
saved on net than are lost when handguns are banned?”167
Cultural cognition theory has important implications for the way in
which government regulates our exposure to risk. Where the irrational
weigher theory sees the role of government as stripping emotion out of risk
perception in the interest of achieving values-neutral, optimally efficient
social policy, the cultural evaluator theory highlights the problem with this
approach: in many cases, it forces law to diverge from the deeply held
normative positions of the citizens it is supposed to govern.168 “If
individuals’ factual beliefs are expressive of cultural worldviews,” Kahan
164. Id. at 748–52.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also id. at 757 (noting that people may rationally “care about
meanings and not just about consequences”).
167. Id. at 762; see also id. at 763 (“Part of what motivates [proponents of gun
control] is an egalitarian and communitarian cultural style that despises the
individualistic connotations of private gun ownership.”); Dan M. Kahan, The
Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 134–36 (2007) [hereinafter
Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State]. It is worth emphasizing that the cultural
evaluator theory is a way of reframing debates between competing views about
the desirability of various risks, not an endorsement of one view over another.
Acknowledging that opponents of gun control are rationally expressing cultural
values when they take those positions does not mean that they are correct that any
particular form of gun control should not be adopted. Nor does it place the
underlying emotions and value judgments beyond debate or contestation. See
Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 762–63. The theory does, however,
help resolve debates in that it highlights the often divergent and deeply felt
normative commitments that underlie opposing views and suggests avenues
towards reconciling those views. See infra notes 257–261 and accompanying text.
168. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, supra note 167, at 118–19.

470

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

notes, “then experts who treat those beliefs as ‘blunders’ unentitled to
normative respect in a ‘deliberative democracy’ are necessarily shielding
regulatory law from citizens’ visions of the good society.”169 The solution
is not to abandon the project of dispassionate risk analysis but rather to
frame discussions about risk in ways that affirm rather than denigrate
individuals’ cultural identities and to frame regulatory solutions as
expressive of a range of social meanings.170
Responses to flood risk are also deeply imbued with cultural meaning.
As with gun control, there are people for whom freedom and individualism
are defining values that suggest government should not be involved in
determining which areas are too risky to inhabit.171 Individuals may
rationally prefer to live in a society that permits them to live where they
choose in exchange for a very real risk of death or the loss of a home over
a society that enforces retreat in the interest of protecting life. The
paternalism inherent in the idea that certain areas should be off limits to
permanent habitation is usually justified by the fact that the costs of
flooding are to some degree spread nationally.172 There is certainly a
tension between claims that property owners have the right to use their
property as they see fit and the demand that flood insurance be affordable,
beaches be replenished, or federal relief be provided in the wake of major
storms. The trouble is that pointing out this inconsistency does not resolve
the debate, as is true in the numerous other instances in which individuals
keenly value the freedom to engage in activity that imposes costs on
others.173

169. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 761.
170. Id. at 765. Kahan refers to these techniques as “cultural identity
affirmation” and “expressive overdetermination.” Id.
171. See Gary Rivlin, Why the Plan to Shrink New Orleans Failed: Revisiting
the Great Katrina Footprint Debate, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 27, 2015), http://five
thirtyeight.com/features/why-the-plan-to-shrink-new-orleans-after-katrina-failed/
(“‘This is America’ was a popular refrain voiced by black and white residents alike
during the debate over the city’s future. If they had the money, people said, who
was the government to tell them they couldn’t rebuild?”) [https://perma.cc/2KMK8R4D].
172. See, e.g., Editorial: How Federal Flood Insurance Puts Homes at Risk,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2wWxYyk (arguing that buyouts of
risky properties would save the federal government money) [https://perma.cc
/9BRW-DSEX].
173. The debate over public health measures to combat obesity often features
this dynamic. See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Making a Soda Tax More Politically
Palatable, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2lnHu51 [https://perma.cc
/6BPK-2AGF].
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The degree of flood risk one chooses to accept is also a judgment that
is in part cultural. It may not even be possible to say that there is a
particular level of flood risk that is “optimal” in the sense of being purely
divorced from cultural values and judgments; in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, some people claimed that the entire city of New Orleans should
be abandoned.174 Deltaic plains have always been flood-prone and yet
have always been home to some of the world’s largest cities.175 There are
many instances in which rebuilding after a natural disaster is entirely
rational.176 No one, for example, thinks that Lisbon should have been
abandoned after its devastating earthquake in 1755.177
This problem can be seen on a smaller scale in the ongoing struggle to
“solve” the problem of what the NFIP refers to as “repetitive loss
properties.”178 Congress has enacted various reforms over the years in an
effort to reduce the enormous costs associated with insuring these
properties.179 The scope of the problem these properties represent is usually
illustrated by the simplistic comparison of the market value of a home with
the total value of insurance benefits it has received under the NFIP,180 as if
a home’s market value was the only relevant measure of its worth.181
Rising sea levels associated with climate change will affect this calculus
in many places, but it is not productive to pretend that eliminating flood

174. See, e.g., Kusky, supra note 9.
175. RICHARD CAMPANELLA, DELTA URBANISM: NEW ORLEANS viii (2010)
[hereinafter CAMPANELLA, DELTA URBANISM].
176. Id. at xiv.
177. Instead, the government imposed seismic building codes to help mitigate the
impact of future earthquakes. See ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE:
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 1 (2010).
178. Repetitive loss properties are properties that have had two or more flood
claims of $10,000 or more in ten years. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 46, at 7 (testimony before Congress).
179. See RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RES. SERV., RL 32972, FEDERAL FLOOD
INSURANCE: THE REPETITIVE LOSS PROBLEM (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/RL32972.pdf [https://perma.cc/T975-88T2].
180. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Felicity Barringer & Mary Williams Walsh, Federal
Flood Insurance Program, Already Fragile, Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2012, at A1.
181. To be clear, this Article does not argue that repetitive loss properties are
not a problem that should be addressed. Its quarrel is with the assumption that the
market value of a home provides a complete account of its worth for the purpose
of deciding whether or not it is appropriate for anyone to live there. A home may
have emotional, cultural, or even economic significance that is not fully reflected
in the price it would fetch on the open market.
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risk altogether is an attainable—or even desirable—goal. Choosing the
right level of flood risk requires a turn to culture.182
Indeed, the cultural valence of attitudes about flood risk is likely to be
even more pronounced than that of other risks because it is inherently local
and thus linked to a sense of community.183 Flood risk has been part of the
culture of southeastern Louisiana for as long as it has been settled by
humans.184 Traditional regional architecture typically features structures
that are elevated several feet off the ground.185 Evacuating in the face of
oncoming hurricanes has been a fact of life for generations. As the response
to the recent flooding in Baton Rouge has shown, even the process of
rebuilding after a flood is subject to a kind of cultural normalization, as
people share knowledge gained after Hurricane Katrina about matters like
how to remove moldy drywall and apply for grant money from FEMA.186
These practices are not just adaptations that help minimize risk but also
indications of the degree to which exposure to flood risk is simply an
accepted part of the local culture. Another way of looking at this

182. A turn to culture is often necessary even when there is an objective “right
answer” to a problem of risk management. Cultural cognition theory emphasizes
that individual reactions that diverge from objective “answers” should not be
dismissed as wrong because they are responding to an activity’s cultural valence and
not statistics concerning its probability of harm. Robert R.M. Verchick, Culture,
Cognition, and Climate, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 969, 980 (2016).
183. Because attitudes toward risk are often culturally determined, they are
sometimes subject to a kind of groupthink: “insofar as one of the primary sources
of information people have about the relationship between their values and a
putatively dangerous activity is what persons who share their commitments think
about it, perceptions of danger naturally feed upon one another among persons who
share cultural commitments.” Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 757.
184. See CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER
TRAGEDIES: A CENTURY OF UNNATURAL DISASTER 36–37 (2014); CAMPANELLA,
DELTA URBANISM, supra note 175, at 27–28.
185. See PIERCE F. LEWIS, NEW ORLEANS: THE MAKING OF AN URBAN
LANDSCAPE 64 (2d ed. 2003); Craig E. Colten, Suburban Sprawl and Poor
Preparation Worsened Flood Damage in Louisiana, THE CONVERSATION (Aug.
22, 2016), http://theconversation.com/suburban-sprawl-and-poor-preparationworsened-flood-damage-in-louisiana-64087 (noting that damage associated with
flooding near Baton Rouge was worsened by newer homes being built on slabs
rather than elevated above grade like traditional architecture) [https://perma.cc
/64VV-VC8P].
186. See Campbell Robertson & Alan Blinder, After Baton Rouge Flooding,
Learning Lessons from New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.ny
times.com/2016/08/23/us/baton-rouge-flooding-lessons-katrina.html [https://perma
.cc/ZL7T-NBJ5].
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phenomenon emphasizes the costs associated with adopting positions that run
counter to the interests or dominant cultural values of one’s community.187
When governments forbid rebuilding, they are picking sides in a battle
that is inherently cultural while attempting to disguise their actions as
purely dispassionate risk analyses. Just as debates over gun control involve
clashing worldviews and thus cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all
sides by appeals to particular sets of data, debates over the appropriateness
of forbidding settlement in areas deemed too risky involve competing
cultural attitudes towards risk and the role of government that cannot be
resolved by actuarial tables alone. When governments foreclose rebuilding
in the wake of disasters, they impermissibly ignore the value judgments of
their own citizens,188 setting up the kind of crisis that occurred in New
Orleans after the release of the green dot map.189
Indeed, rebuilding after a storm is expressive not just in the sense that
it declares support for certain abstract values like individualism but also in
the sense that it expresses and reinforces membership in a community. For
many, being a resident of a neighborhood, city, region, or state is a vitally
important aspect of self-identity. In such cases, returning home after a
storm represents a refusal to abandon that identity, the way a diehard sports
fan who refuses to give up on her team after a dismal season strengthens
her identity as a fan. Rebuilding after a flood thus claims not just the
myriad positive qualities associated with the ability to rebuild and the
equality of status with those who were not flooded but also a cultural
commitment to a particular way of life and a particular region or
neighborhood.

187. Verchick, supra note 182, at 980–81. On this view, a resident of a floodprone coastal community who favors retreat is something like a Yankees fan
living in Boston. Id.
188. Kahan, Two Conceptions, supra note 35, at 761.
189. Richard Campanella, a professor of geography at Tulane who at one point
advised the BNOB, made a similar point during the uproar over the proposal in an
editorial in the Times-Picayune. Noting that participants in the “great footprint debate”
could be grouped into warring “philosophies, . . . each with its own logic, passion,
experts, and dogma,” Campanella argued that individuals’ views on the matter were
determined by “a tangle of personal, cultural, financial, nostalgic, practical, and
scientific factors.” Richard Campanella, In Post-Katrina New Orleans: Abandon?
Maintain? Concede?, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2006
/04/new_orleans_footprint_katrina.html (last updated May 20, 2015 at 9:49 AM)
[https://perma.cc/8RSS-54XB].
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C. Recovery as Resistance
Rebuilding after a storm can also be an act of defiance against an
unfair and discriminatory system. Because flood risk is often correlated
with race and socioeconomic status,190 and because the harms associated
with “natural” disasters are often exacerbated by governmental policies
and actions of one form or another, storms frequently appear to expose and
exacerbate societal inequalities. Like the victim of a tort who in taking
revenge attempts to restore an equality of status with a tortfeasor, those
who rebuild after a storm are in many cases trying to get even, in this case
with their whiter, wealthier, drier neighbors and with the government that
seems to have treated them as expendable.
Storms reinforce an ugly and painful reality about American society:
we often treat the poor and minorities as less deserving of protection from
all nature of risks and seem less willing to help when those risks are
realized. In the month before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans officials
distributed a DVD in low-income areas of the city, the purpose of which
“was to let people know New Orleans was too broke to help even the
infirm or the disabled in the event of a major hurricane. Our main message,
the DVD’s producer told the Times-Picayune, ‘is that each person is
primarily responsible for themselves.’”191 The city, along with the state and
federal governments, then proceeded to prove the truth of this warning. No
means of evacuation were provided in advance of the storm for those who
did not own cars—an estimated 100,000 people192—and many of them spent
several days in appalling conditions at the convention center and the
190. CHRISTOPHER DALBOM ET AL., COMMUNITY RESETTLEMENT PROSPECTS IN
SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION OF LEGAL,
CULTURAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF MOVING INDIVIDUALS AND
COMMUNITIES 3 (2014); Fothergill, Maestas & Darlington, supra note 151, at 161
(“[D]isaster-connected deaths were disproportionately high among ethnic
minorities.”). In New Orleans, land that is farther from the river and thus lower in
elevation was historically much more likely to be inhabited by black people. Craig
E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental Equity in New Orleans,
1890-1930, 28 J. OF HIST. GEOGRAPHY 237, 237 (2002).
191. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 49 (2015).
192. STAFF OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE
PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, FAILURE OF
INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT 113 (2006). Those living in flooded areas were
significantly more likely to lack access to a car. BROOKINGS INST., NEW ORLEANS
AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 13 (Oct. 1,
2005), https: //www.brookings.edu/research/new-orleans-after-the-storm-lessonsfrom-the-past-a-plan-for-the-future [https://perma.cc/2C28-SBYS] [hereinafter
FAILURE OF INITIATIVE].

2017]

STRONGER THAN THE STORM

475

Superdome.193 The direct impacts of the storm itself were similarly
disparate: the homes of 80% of the city’s black population flooded,
compared with 54% of the city’s white population.194
For many, Hurricane Katrina was so chilling in part because it
“exposed” these truths.195 But Hurricane Katrina was certainly not the first
illustration of these problems. During the catastrophic Mississippi River
floods of 1927, black refugees were subject to horrific conditions in
segregated Red Cross camps.196 After Hurricane Frederic made landfall on
the Gulf Coast in 1979, 33 counties in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida were
declared disaster areas.197 FEMA “restored power in black communities only
after it was restored in white areas, and black communities received less
emergency shelter, ice, food, and assistance than did white communities.”198
That there was a message in Hurricane Katrina’s devastation was not
lost on its victims.199 For many people, the storm demonstrated that society

193. See FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 192, at 117–23 (describing
conditions at the Superdome and convention center and delays in completing
evacuation). Although much has been written about the conditions at the
Superdome—the city’s official shelter for those who did not evacuate—and the
convention center—which became an unofficial shelter for reasons that have
never been determined, it is worthwhile to be reminded of the basic facts: an
estimated 19,000 people gathered at the convention center, which had no food,
water, security personnel, electricity, lighting, air conditioning, or functioning
toilets. Id. at 118. The Superdome, where roughly 12,000 people gathered, was in
somewhat better shape: it had food, water, and National Guard troops on hand. Id.
at 117, 120.
194. ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INST., KATRINA’S WINDOW:
CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS AMERICA 2 (Oct. 1, 2005),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/katrinas-window-confronting-concentratedpoverty-across-america [https://perma.cc/77KB-QTUF]. Notably, black people
did not make up a disproportionate share of the 818 fatalities in Louisiana for
which race is recorded. Jonkman et al., supra note 40, at 685. The data, however,
is incomplete: it covers only two-thirds of the total number of Katrina-related
fatalities in Louisiana. See id.
195. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Storm After the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2005, at A23 (“[Floods] expose the underlying power structures, the injustices,
the patterns of corruption and the unacknowledged inequalities.”).
196. KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra note 184, at 70.
197. Id. at 167.
198. Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25 LAW &
INEQUALITY 297, 298–302 (2007) (describing history of racially disparate
treatment in disaster recovery).
199. Or on Kanye West, who notoriously interrupted a live televised charity
fundraiser after Hurricane Katrina to declare that “George Bush doesn’t care about
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regarded them as unworthy of concern or protection. “We were
abandoned. City officials did nothing to protect us,” one victim testified
before the bipartisan House committee that was set up to investigate
governmental actions before and after Hurricane Katrina.200 “We never felt
so cut off in all our lives.”201 Charmaine Marchand, who represented the
Lower Ninth Ward in the Louisiana Legislature, noted the widespread
“perception that the white establishment in New Orleans left its black
citizens to die.”202 “If it were affluent whites who were flooded and
stranded on the side of the highway,” Marchand added, “I don’t think
America would have let them starve.”203 This sentiment was widely held:
a survey of refugees taken in a shelter in Houston a week and a half after
the storm found that 68% of evacuees believed that “the federal
government would have responded more quickly to rescue people trapped
by floodwaters if more of them had been wealthier and white rather than
poorer and black.”204
Although rebuilding might help counter this message, being forbidden
from rebuilding only makes the message stronger: not only does the
government not care about residents enough to keep them safe, such
behavior suggests, it would prefer if they could be simply erased from their
city altogether.205 During the “footprint debate” in New Orleans, members
of the city’s white elite spoke openly about the opportunity Hurricane
Katrina gave them to demographically cleanse the city. Mere weeks after
Hurricane Katrina made landfall, members of the city’s elite were meeting
black people.” Jon Caramanica, The Education of Kanye West, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
26, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2l2YmSf [https://perma.cc/6892-EK48].
200. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 192, at 6.
201. Id. A review of the psychological literature on the impacts of natural
disasters noted that
“social class and race contribute[] to residents’ psychological reactions
to disasters” and described a study showing that “[i]n a small South
Carolina town, founded on slave labour, the African-American victims
recalled—in the context of needing assistance from others after the
storm—their grandparents’ stories of slave days. In particular, they
recounted how their ancestors were dependent on the white plantation
masters and slave owners.”
Fothergill, Maestas & Darlington, supra note 151, at 161–62.
202. Frank Etheridge, Last of the Ninth, SALON (Sept. 13, 2005, 8:25 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2005/09/13/ninth [https://perma.cc/NL7T-3VWR].
203. Id.
204. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 136, at 41.
205. William P. Quigley, What Katrina Revealed, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
361, 374 (2008) (arguing that the BNOB rebuilding plan indicated that “[p]oor
and working people are movable, interchangeable, and disposable”).
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to discuss rebuilding the city with “better services and fewer poor
people.”206 Although the work of the Urban Planning Commission on the
footprint question was framed in the race-neutral language of risk and
sustainability, the effect was the same: one study showed that the
Commission’s proposal meant closing off the homes of 80% of the city’s
black population.207
Again, the message was not lost. After the first public presentation of
the proposal, the city councilwoman who represented the Lower Ninth
Ward and most of New Orleans East angrily told reporters that her
neighbors were “not going to allow themselves to be shoved into the back
of the bus.”208 When the commission regrouped and released a revised
version of its plan—in this iteration, a four-month moratorium would be
placed on building permits in certain neighborhoods, which would be
converted into “green space” if they did not in that time prove their longterm viability—the reaction was even more intense.209 At a packed public
meeting, residents angrily accused the mayor of “taking part in a ‘Katrina
cleansing’” and attacked the plan for trying to “turn ‘black people’s
neighborhoods into white people’s parks.’”210 Survey data taken six
months later showed that more than half of black people in New Orleans
believed that they “were being given worse treatment and opportunities in
the rebuilding process than white[] [people].”211
New Orleans is not the only example of this phenomenon. There is a
long history of tension arising over post-disaster efforts to increase
resiliency that are perceived as thinly veiled forms of social engineering.
After devastating fires in both Chicago and San Francisco, proposals to
206. Christopher Cooper, Old-Line Families Escape Worst of Flood and Plot
the Future, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2005, at A1 (describing planned meeting of 40 city
business leaders in Dallas to “begin mapping out a future for the city”). One wealthy
businessman, James Reiss, was willing to be quoted in the Wall Street Journal,
explaining that “[t]hose who want to see this city rebuilt want to see it done in a
completely different way: demographically, geographically and politically . . . . I’m
not just speaking for myself here. The way we’ve been living is not going to happen
again, or we’re out.” Id. Reiss was later named to the mayor’s BNOB. RIVLIN, supra
note 1, at 136; see also GRATZ, supra note 13, at 33–34.
207. RIVLIN, supra note 1, at 177.
208. Id. at 176.
209. Id. at 209–15.
210. Id. at 214. Marc Morial, the mayor of New Orleans from 1994–2002,
attended the meeting to offer his own view on the plan: “It’s telling people who
have lost almost everything that we’re going to take the last vestige of what they
own.” Id. at 215.
211. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 136, at 6, 41. Only 19% of white
people shared this view. Id. at 4.
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outlaw wood construction in favor of more fireproof—and more
expensive—materials were vociferously opposed by poor immigrants,
who organized sometimes violent protests and complained of class
discrimination.212 In Chicago, the prohibition on wood construction was
seen as representing “a de facto denial of the ability of all Chicagoans to
remain full citizens of their community.”213 “Better a city of shacks owned
by the people,” a Catholic priest said at a rally in San Francisco, “than a
city of skyscrapers owned by Eastern capitalists. The extension of the fire
limits will be our ruin.”214 Both proposed reforms failed.215
In these circumstances, rebuilding can be an act of resistance. New
Orleanians who lived in the neighborhoods targeted for elimination by the
BNOB’s proposal were explicit in expressing this sentiment. At the first
set of public meetings after the plan was revealed, one resident pledged to
“sit in my front door with a shotgun.”216 Another resident, referring to the
fact that New Orleans was one of the few large cities that did not
experience rioting after the assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968,217
predicted that “[i]f the situation continues to erode, we are going to incite
people to do what this city never did.”218 At another meeting, a resident of
the Lower Ninth Ward—a neighborhood slated for conversion into green
space in the BNOB’s plan—said “that her home would be taken ‘over my
dead body’” and another warned that “if you come to take our property,
you better come ready.”219
It is by no means the case that every flood metes out a larger share of
damage on minorities and the poor or that the policy of retreat would
always have a disproportionate impact on already-marginalized groups.220
212. KAREN SAWISLAK, SMOLDERING CITY: CHICAGOANS AND THE GREAT
FIRE, 1871–1874, at 145 (1995); Lawrence J. Vale, Restoring Urban Vitality, in
REBUILDING URBAN PLACES AFTER DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE
KATRINA 149, 152 (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2006) (noting
that in San Francisco, “Lower-income homeowners also feared that they would
not be able to afford to rebuild.”).
213. SAWISLAK, supra note 212, at 145.
214. Vale, supra note 212, at 152.
215. SAWISLAK, supra note 212, at 121; VALE, supra note 212, at 153.
216. Donze, Let Us Decide, supra note 14.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Russell & Donze, supra note 12, at A1.
220. For example, preliminary reports from Houston seem to indicate that the
flooding from Hurricane Harvey affected rich and poor alike. See Juliet
Linderman, Black, White, Rich, Poor: Storm Harvey Didn’t Discriminate, CHI.
TRIBUNE (Sept. 3, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ctharvey-victims-20170903-story.html [https://perma.cc/XDC8-CFK4].
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But when they do, rebuilding takes on a vitally important messaging
function, an insistence on the value of one’s community in the face of
those who have neglected it and would apparently prefer to see it
disappear. This, then, is another factor that helps explain why people often
feel so keenly the need to rebuild after storms and why governments often
find it politically impossible to prevent them from doing so.
D. Other Factors
In sum, rebuilding can be expressive in a range of ways, all of which
are vitally important to the victims of major storms. Appreciating this
leads to new insights into ways in which governments may be able to make
retreat more politically palatable by providing alternative means of doing
the expressive work that rebuilding does. Before turning to those
alternatives in Part III, it is worth pausing here to address a handful of
counter-arguments that could be levelled at the idea that the difficulty in
preventing people from rebuilding can be understood by focusing on its
expressive elements, as well as to add a few caveats.
To many, the problems that doomed the BNOB’s proposal to forbid
rebuilding in certain heavily damaged, high-risk neighborhoods were
largely procedural. Because so many residents of the neighborhoods in
question were still scattered across the country in the months following the
storm, few were able to attend the handful of public meetings the Urban
Planning Commission held to discuss its plan.221 The result was that
residents felt stunned by the news that they would be forbidden from
returning to their homes, while the commission was blindsided by the
wave of opposition that followed the publication of the green dot map on
the cover of the local newspaper. The importance of the flawed procedure,
however, only goes so far. It would be wrong to conclude that more and
better meetings are the answer to the problem of how to make retreat in
the wake of disasters palatable to the people whose homes have been
destroyed. The anger expressed by those who faced what would have been
a second destruction of their neighborhoods did not appear to be triggered
by a lack of procedure: people complained not only of feeling uninformed
or being surprised but also of being shut out of their homes and prevented
from rebuilding their lives.222 The value people place on their homes and

221. The meetings were largely attended by residents of comparatively dry,
unharmed neighborhoods, who perhaps unsurprisingly tended to support the idea
of converting heavily flooded areas into green space. Campanella, A Katrina
Lexicon, supra note 13, at 29.
222. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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the freedom to rebuild them does not seem likely to be extinguished by a
certain number of meetings.
Indeed, the Constitution already protects the ability of property
owners to rebuild after storms through the Takings Clause.223 Forbidding
a homeowner from returning to, rebuilding, and inhabiting a home
certainly would constitute a taking and thus trigger an obligation to
provide compensation.224 No one has ever seriously claimed otherwise,
and the proposal to close off certain neighborhoods in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina was always conceded to constitute a taking for which
compensation would be offered.225 Although the Takings Clause ensures
a basic level of protection of property rights, it apparently does not make
retreat acceptable to people.226 The offer of compensation for the forced
abandonment of neighborhoods did not make the green dot map politically
palatable in New Orleans. Simply saying that retreat is something that can
be done constitutionally does not mean that it can be done practically; the
emotional obstacles remain.
The issue of eminent domain raises the broader question of the role of
money in the effort to encourage retreat. The federal government, after all,
is extraordinarily generous with post-disaster relief funding, at least
compared with other forms of individual need.227 This extreme
generosity—Congress appropriated about $120 billion in disaster relief
223. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
224. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
225. See Michelle Krupa, Many Areas Marked for Green Space After Katrina
Have Rebounded, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 23, 2010), http://s.nola.com/eHSuv0F
(noting that proposed conversion of neighborhoods to green space was planned to
occur only after a “government buyout program”) [https://perma.cc/4BY7-LGPK].
226. Indeed, Louisiana was one of many states that passed new restrictions on
the ability of governments to acquire property by eminent domain during the
intense nationwide backlash against the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In 2006, just a year after Hurricane Katrina,
voters approved two new constitutional amendments aimed at overruling the
Court’s decision. See Act No. 851, 2006 La. Acts 2957 (amending LA. CONST.
art. VII § 10); Act No. 859, 2006 La. Acts 2974 (amending LA. CONST. art. I § 4);
see also Frank S. Alexander, Louisiana Land Reform in the Storm’s Aftermath,
53 LOY. L. REV. 727 (2007). The wording of the amendments makes it at least an
open question whether the state government could constitutionally condemn
individual properties for the purpose of protecting their owners from future floods,
even if it were willing to provide compensation. See LA. CONST. art. I § 4(B)
(allowing condemnation of private property for, inter alia, “drainage, flood
control, levees, coastal and navigational protection and reclamation for the benefit
of the public generally”).
227. See Landis, supra note 51, at 969–71.
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after Hurricane Katrina and $60 billion after Hurricane Sandy228—might
be seen as an adequate response to whatever harm the government causes
individuals when it enforces retreat in the wake of floods. It is possible, after
all, that New Orleanians who opposed the closing of their neighborhoods
simply did not know that they would be entitled to compensation for the
value of their homes or did not believe that their perpetually cash-starved
government would be able to honor that obligation. Perhaps governments
need only compensate their citizens in exchange for forcing them to abandon
their homes to make the prospect politically palatable.
There are, however, reasons to think that compensation would not
make retreat acceptable. Seeing recovery as an act of revenge helps show
why. The receipt of money from a fund lacks this adversarial element and
therefore also lacks the sense of correction that rebuilding can provide. For
many tort theorists, tort law’s insistence on a connection between tortfeasor
and victim, which is variously referred to as the “bipolar,” “relational,” or
“bilateral” nature of tort law, has deep normative significance.229 By insisting
on a connection between tortfeasor and victim, tort law “reflects the normative
structure of our relationships with one another”230 and thus “is at least
consistent with the intuition that victims find a satisfaction in pursuing their
injurers that they would not derive from recourse through a pooled fund.”231
Receiving disaster aid from a fund in exchange for being forced to move
elsewhere is akin to receiving compensation that does not come from a
tortfeasor. It may make the victim “whole” by undoing a certain allocation
of costs related to an injury, but it does nothing to offer “satisfaction,” to
assert a right to a certain standard of treatment at the hands of others and
228. See LINDSAY, supra note 47, at 13.
229. See Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law,
105 GEO. L.J. 55, 85–87 (2016).
230. Jules L. Coleman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1149,
1155 (2008); see also John C. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs,
88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 975 (2010) (arguing that tort law “guides conduct by
reference to, gives recognition to, and enforces duties not to mistreat others”);
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64
MD. L. REV. 364, 366–70 (2005) (arguing that tort law “is devoted primarily to
articulating relational obligations and empowering victims injured by breaches of
those obligations to sue for redress” and thus promotes, inter alia, “the values of
holding persons responsible to members of identifiable classes of other persons”
and “encouraging citizens to think of themselves as bearers of obligations to
others”); Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J.
695, 721 (arguing that tort law “enunciates norms that designate certain courses
of conduct as tortious and, in a sense, as legally wrongful, or as violations of legal
rights” and thus “is injunctive and guiding”).
231. Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1401.
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thus help the victim get even. Placing the emphasis on rebuilding as an act
of cultural expression only heightens the problem further: money does not
lessen the pain of being forced to abandon a community, a set of values, or a
way of life. The same is true if the focus is on rebuilding as an act of resistance.
The fact that the government is willing to offer money in exchange for making
a resident abandon a home whose destruction it was partly responsible for
apparently does not do much to lessen the perceived wrong. Money lacks the
redemptive, cultural, and declaratory power of rebuilding.
The federal government’s generosity with post-disaster aid further
supports this view. One leading view is that this generosity reveals something
about this country’s puritanical attitudes towards poverty: the poor are
perceived to be lazy while those who are flooded are perceived to be blameless
victims.232 Another possibility is that the project of post-disaster recovery is
normatively significant both for individuals and for society more broadly.
People need the chance to get even after being flooded, and the nation needs
to demonstrate that it does not allow its citizens to be wiped out by natural
disasters, that this is a harm that is unacceptable.233 In helping people
rebuild, governments express a level of respect for their ways of life and
communities and attempt to undo the perceived wrong in having allowed
them to flood in the first place.
To be sure, seeing elements of revenge, culture, and resistance in the act
of rebuilding one’s home after a storm does not mean that the emotional
impulses emphasized in this Article are the only, or even the primary,
reasons local governments find it difficult to move people away from their
homes in the wake of disasters. Of course, a major—maybe even the
major—aspect of the desire to rebuild is indeed the desire to recreate an
allocation of goods—one’s house, for instance—that existed before a
232. Landis, supra note 51, at 971, 988–98 (tracing the “intellectual and spiritual
traditions prevalent among the founders” that “provide some insight into the
sympathetic treatment they afforded disasters”). Another theory traces congressional
attention to disaster victims to the structure of the nation’s political system, which
tends to favor problems that are concentrated in particular political subdivisions over
those that are spread nationally. See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster
Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 4–6 (1996).
233. After Hurricane Katrina, the actor Brad Pitt started a foundation called
“Make it Right” that set about building new homes designed by prominent architects
in the Lower Ninth Ward for families whose homes had been destroyed during the
flood. See MAKE IT RIGHT, http://makeitright.org/about/history/ (last visited Sept. 19,
2017) [https://perma.cc/YZA5-T7AD]. The idea that the flood’s destruction was
something that needed to be “made right” and that this could be accomplished by
building new homes for people in the same neighborhood is a perfect illustration of
the broader normative significance of disaster recovery and the sense in which it
contains aspects of corrective justice.
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disaster. This way of looking at things, however, does not fully capture the
emotional tenor of the desire to rebuild. If it did, it would not be necessary
to treat rebuilding as an adversarial process, to speak of being “stronger than
the storm.” After all, the storm has not gained anything by hurting those
people affected and is in no position to restore anything to them.234 And if all
that mattered was correcting an allocation of goods, one might think that
people would be much more willing to treat their losses as commensurate with
the various forms of compensation that are frequently offered after major
disasters.
There are also numerous other confounding factors at work. Perhaps the
simplest and most obvious obstacle is cost. The financial burden of
compensating residential property owners may be prohibitive for many city
and state governments, although it is worth noting that the federal
government has made money available to help fund retreat in certain
circumstances235 and could do so more broadly in the future.
A related problem is that land use regulation is largely left up to local
governments.236 Particularly when the costs of floods and other disasters are
socialized to a significant degree through federally funded engineering
projects and post-disaster aid, local governments often lack the incentive to
anticipate and adequately prepare for long-term, complex risks like sea level
rise. Indeed, in a way New Orleans is actually an unusually easy case, as
roughly half of the city is above sea level.237 This makes it possible to render
policy judgments that distinguish between different areas of the city on the

234. This thought parallels the line of attack Hershovitz levels at the classic
articulation of corrective justice as a descriptive account of the tort system generally.
As Hershovitz notes, there are vanishingly few cases in which the tort system is able
to offer corrective justice in the sense of restoring to a victim something that was
wrongfully taken by a tortfeasor. See Hershovitz, supra note 117, at 110–12.
235. See SIDERS, supra note 22, at 110–13.
236. Kaswan, supra note 67, at 394 n.10.
237. Cf. Andy Horowitz, New Orleans’s New Flood Maps: An Outline for
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/opinion
/new-orleans-new-flood-maps-an-outline-for-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/VYT7955M?safari=1] (stating about 54% of New Orleans is currently below sea level).
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basis of flood risk.238 Many smaller coastal municipalities are facing complete
inundation and thus do not have this luxury.239
Finally, it is possible that Kahan’s skepticism of the irrational weigher
model of risk perception is less merited in the context of flood risk. In other
words, it may be the case that people are actually mistaken about the
magnitude of the risk they face and that the cognitive biases identified in the
psychological literature as tending to distort the general perception of disaster
risk are best characterized as impairments in thinking and not value
judgments. On the other hand, cognitive biases are much less likely to
downplay the significance of flood risk in the immediate aftermath of a flood.
During such times, the “availability heuristic” suggests that individuals are
likely to overestimate the risk of flooding.240 This is why participation in the
NFIP spikes after hurricanes.241
It is important not to overstate the force of any of the myriad factors
that contribute to individuals’ desire to return and rebuild after floods
because not everyone comes back. Some people simply are unable to
return, and others decide they prefer to settle elsewhere. The goal of this
Article is not to suggest unavoidable psychological imperatives but rather
to offer a way of understanding a phenomenon. Armed with a deeper
understanding of why residents feel the need to rebuild, scholars and
policymakers can see the various ways in which it is problematic for
governments to prevent residents from doing so and thus begin to think
about alternative processes that provide some sense of repair without
putting people right back in harm’s way.
III. REPAIR WITHOUT REBUILDING
Appreciating the various emotional aspects of rebuilding leads to new
insights on how to replicate some of the salve that rebuilding provides without
allowing people to move back into the same risky places. If by rebuilding
people implicitly claim a range of positive qualities for themselves, express
238. FEMA recently released newly revised flood insurance rate maps for the
New Orleans area. The maps show that, thanks to small variations in local
elevation—and the newly updated multi-billion-dollar levee system surrounding
the city—many areas of New Orleans are not considered to be in the 100-year
flood zone at all. See Mark Schleifstein, Final New Orleans Flood Insurance Maps
Show Lower Rates for Many, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.nola
.com/environment/index.ssf/2016/03/final_new_orleans_flood_insura.html [https:
//perma.cc/XT7U-UEBJ]; see also Horowitz, supra note 237.
239. See Rao, supra note 55.
240. See supra note 106.
241. See supra note 106.
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their commitments to their communities and ways of life, and get even
with their unaffected peers and the governments who have neglected them,
then alternatives to rebuilding should strive to accomplish similar ends.
Although there are no easy answers, governments may be able to achieve
these goals by conducting adversarial proceedings, preserving and replicating
communities in new locations, and constructing memorials.242
A. Suing the Storm
If rebuilding after a storm can be seen as an act of revenge in the sense
that a tort suit is an act of revenge, perhaps governments that seek to bar
rebuilding should consider providing some form of recourse against
storms, the way governments that have barred revenge have provided tort
law as an alternative. An important emotional aspect of filing a lawsuit is
claiming the right to tell one’s story to a representative of the public.243 A
suit also represents societal concern for the wrong one has suffered, and a
successful suit helps a plaintiff correct that wrong in various ways.244 It is
possible to imagine that many of these effects could be achieved by some
form of adversarial proceeding set up outside the realm of the modern court
system. Notably, many of these benefits do not depend on the participation of
a tortfeasor; one can achieve a measure of corrective justice even when
nobody is available to be cross examined, accept responsibility, or pay
damages.
Legal history and indeed the history of tort law in particular is full of
examples of vengeful impulses directed against non-human entities.245 The
deodand system in thirteenth-century England allowed those who suffered
harms to take revenge against the cause of the harm: “If a cart struck and
injured a victim, the victim was entitled to the cart, not simply for its value,

242. To be clear, this Article envisions the following ideas as complements
to—not replacements for—the traditional regulatory approaches to retreat that
have been advanced by others. The aim is to offer ways of making the legal tools
discussed in Part I more politically and psychologically palatable.
243. See THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR
LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT 37 (2004) (“This is the moral
imperative of a public trial: the opportunity to tell your story in open court; to
speak of the grievance and memorialize the hurt; to confront those who are
responsible for the injury and have them account for their wrongdoing; to create
an official record of the proceedings, a permanent place of memory so that the
incident is not forgotten.”).
244. See supra notes 112–132 and accompanying text.
245. See Sherwin, supra note 34, at 1404.
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but so that he could avenge himself on the source of the harm.”246 For
hundreds of years, mostly between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries,
Western Europeans conducted elaborate legal proceedings against animals
of all kinds.247 In a thoughtful exploration of the practice, William Ewald
describes a case brought in ecclesiastical court against rats in the town of
Autun, France.248 A formal complaint was filed, charging the rats with a
felony for having “eaten and wantonly destroyed some barley crops in the
jurisdiction,” and a respected local lawyer was appointed to defend
them.249 The rats failed to appear in court, and their lawyer resorted to a
series of procedural arguments, eventually succeeding in getting the suit
dismissed because the rats were never properly given notice of the
complaint.250 The case made the lawyer famous, earning him “a formidable
reputation as a criminal defense attorney.”251
To modern ears, steeped in the values and attitudes of the enlightenment
and, more recently, legal realism, these proceedings sound fanciful, or even
insane. For Ewald, this is the very point of talking about them. Ewald was
interested in asking a broader series of questions about the project of
comparative law, by illustrating the extreme difficulty of understanding
the thinking of Western Europeans as recently as 500 years ago. They are
relevant here for a different reason: not to imply that due process should
be afforded to hurricanes, but rather to suggest that lawsuits need not have
any possibility of offering “relief” in the traditional sense to have a
purpose, and to raise the possibility that perhaps suing a hurricane would
not be completely insane after all. Indeed, one of the possible explanations
for the widespread and serious prosecutions of animals that Ewald puts
forward is that, like deodands, they were intended “to give comfort to the
soul of the victim” and “to restore calm to a troubled community.”252

246. Id. (citing 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473–74 (1895)).
247. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What Was it Like To
Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1898–1916 (1995); Walter Woodburn Hyde,
The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages
and Modern Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696 (1916); EDWARD P. EVANS, THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS (1906).
248. See Ewald, supra note 247, at 1898–1901.
249. Id. at 1898.
250. Id. at 1898–99.
251. Id. at 1899. Ewald notes that the lawyer went on to write a respected
treatise on the excommunication of insects and continued to represent animals
with the same skill and attention he devoted to his human clients over the course
of an illustrious career. Id. at 1900.
252. Id. at 1914, 1939.
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A useful modern analogy might be the emerging practice of restorative
justice. Although notoriously hard to define, restorative justice is an
approach to criminal justice that rejects punitive incarceration in favor of
some alternative approach, often characterized by a meeting or gathering
in which victims of crime confront perpetrators of crime in an effort to
heal the wrong that has occurred.253 There are today at least four major
strands of restorative justice, each to some degree incompatible with the
others both in theory and in practice.254 The form most applicable here is
the “psychotherapeutic” strand, which sees “restoring the victim of a harm
to a healthful state of psychological well-being [as] the fundamental act of
restorative justice.”255 Underlying this approach are lessons from the
psychology of trauma, which sees trauma as the result of “the faltering or
breaking of protective cognitive assumptions,” calling for recovery via “a
process of narrative self-empowerment.”256 What is needed, according to
this subset of the restorative justice literature, is a process that allows victims
to “rebuild assumptive worlds shaken by the traumatic experience” with
techniques like truth-telling, empowerment, and narrative.257
The psychotherapeutic restorative justice literature tends to rely on the
physical edifice as a metaphor, and the frequent talk of breaking down and
rebuilding hints at how applicable these ideas are to the context of recovery
from natural disasters.258 Homes and communities are both crucial aspects
of people’s cognitive landscapes, and seeing them destroyed often causes

253. See Joseph Robinson & Jennifer Hudson, Restorative Justice: A Typology
and Critical Appraisal, 23 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 335, 335–39
(2016).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 348.
256. Id. at 349.
257. Id. at 349–50.
258. One technique being used in an effort to prevent mental health problems
in the wake of natural disasters is called “debriefing.” It involves small groups of
people involved in the disaster meeting in a single session to share individual
feelings and experiences. DAVID KINCHIN, A GUIDE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
DEBRIEFING: MANAGING EMOTIONAL DECOMPRESSION AND POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER 43–63 (2007); see also Maria R. Volpe, Restorative Justice in
Post-Disaster Situations: Untapped Potential, 8 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL.
611 (2007) (noting the possibility of using restorative justice to help heal anger
towards other people that often flares up in the wake of disaster, such as anger
towards American Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or towards
FEMA in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, but not exploring the idea of using
restorative justice to redirect anger towards natural disasters themselves).
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trauma.259 Viewed in this light, rebuilding can be part of a process of
cognitive repair as well as a kind of retribution. Restorative justice suggests
that proceedings focused on empowering victims through techniques like
narrative might help lessen the need to use physical rebuilding as a means
of psychological restoration.
Perhaps, in the wake of major floods, allowing people to sue the storm
would have similar effects. Like a French town suing rats for eating its harvest,
a town destroyed by a flood might find some solace in airing its grievances
against the unthinking, unfeeling forces of nature. There is certainly value in
having an opportunity to tell one’s story, and a government that takes the time
to listen to that story suggests by doing so that what one has to say matters.
To be clear, this Article does not propose that the court system be enlisted to
entertain lawsuits filed against hurricanes. But some sort of governmental
forum dedicated to the gathering of evidence of the impacts of climate
change would perhaps make a difference. One idea would be to create a
standing congressional inquiry commission like the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission or the 9/11 Commission, tasked with collecting and recording
evidence and suggesting remedies on an ongoing basis. Such an institution
would provide an outlet for the anger people feel towards hurricanes while
also creating an opportunity for the expressive elements of revenge.
B. Culture, Relocated
If rebuilding is expressive of a set of cultural commitments—
individualism, resiliency, and membership in a community—and forbidding
rebuilding is expressive of a competing set of cultural commitments—
efficiency and harm prevention—disputes over retreat can begin to seem
intractable. Cultural cognition theory, however, suggests ways in which these
competing worldviews can be reconciled to reach compromise solutions. Of
overriding importance is “social meaning overdetermination.”260 Instead of
trying to drain all cultural meaning out of a particular regulatory approach
by, for instance, treating it as objectively optimal in light of some set of
empirical data, cultural cognition theory suggests that we should try to
pack it full of social meaning so that competing groups can “find their
values and hence their identities affirmed by it.”261
Kahan and co-author Donald Braman illustrate these ideas by
recounting the history of the Native American Graves Protection and
259. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed., rev. 1987) (noting that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”) can be caused by the “sudden destruction of one’s home or community”).
260. See Braman & Kahan, supra note 35, at 587.
261. Id.; Verchick, supra note 182, at 982–83, 987.
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Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”), which resolved a bitter dispute over the
custody of Native American remains between scientists who wanted to
study them and tribes who wanted their sanctity respected.262 The
legislation eventually allowed tribes to grant or withhold consent for the
remains to be retained by museums and anthropologists, thus affirming
their significance for tribes and the legitimacy of the tribes’ claim to them
while also allowing scientists to obtain consent and to delay returning the
items if they play an important role in a particular scientific study.263
How can measures formulated to implement retreat be designed so that
they incorporate multiple social meanings and affirm the cultural
worldview of those who would strongly prefer to remain where they are?
As with NAGPRA, part of the answer should be to affirm the value of the
lives people lived in high-risk communities as well as legitimize the values
that might lead them to oppose governmental efforts to force them out of
their homes. Adversarial proceedings can have some of this effect, as they
legitimize the anger people feel toward the forces that have destroyed so
much of value to them and demonstrate a societal concern for their losses.
Demonstrating respect for the particular communities at issue can be done
in a variety of ways, including resettling them intact and memorializing
them when they are destroyed by storms.264 It is also possible that retreat
measures could be crafted in such a way as to affirm the attitudes about
the role of government and individual responsibility that underlie some
opposition to them.
1. Resettlement
One way in which governments may be able to make retreat palatable
is by moving entire communities essentially intact. This process is known
as “resettlement,” as distinguished from relocation, which involves

262. Braman & Kahan, supra note 35, at 588–95.
263. Id. at 592–93. The provisions of the Act were the product of the Panel for
a National Dialogue on Museum/Native American Relations, which convened top
scientists and tribal leaders and spent a year conducting meetings and drafting a
report with its recommendations. See REPORT OF THE PANEL FOR A NATIONAL
DIALOGUE ON MUSEUM/NATIVE AMERICAN RELATIONS, Feb. 28, 1990, reprinted
in 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487 (1992).
264. Other strategies emphasized by cultural cognition theory include
emphasizing local benefits of climate change adaptation, consciously engaging
local communities, and relying on local—as opposed to national—experts in
communicating about risk. Verchick, supra note 182, at 1010–13 (discussing
adaptation efforts initiated in the wake of the 2008 flooding in Iowa).
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individuals moving piecemeal.265 By resettling whole communities,
governments help counter several of the harms associated with disasters,
affirming their value in a few senses. Resettling communities necessarily
implies an appreciation of their worth, in sharp contrast with simply
outlawing rebuilding, which implies that the larger polity has no need of
and would be better off without the community in question. Resettling
communities intact suggests that the connections among members of the
community, their shared relationships and culture, have value that should
be preserved. It also serves to counter some of the equality harms
associated with flooding. Although flooded areas receive the message that
they are “less than” their drier neighbors—less deserving of protection,
less able to afford drier locations, less prudent in selecting where to live—
governments that relocate communities send the signal that allowing them
to flood repeatedly is not acceptable. Resettlement and all the expense and
attention it entails implies that a community is worth protecting,
maintaining, and preserving. It is a gesture of respect.
Resettlement has a spotty record. In May 2016, residents of the tiny
community of Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana were hailed as the “First
American Climate Refugees” when they agreed to move away from their
tiny sliver of land and resettle in an entirely new community farther from
the coast.266 The community, first settled in the early nineteenth century,
is composed almost entirely of members of the Biloxi-ChitimachaChoctaw tribe, and the idea of creating a new community in a safer
location was important to them: “We consider ourselves lucky because we
want to put our community together again,” the tribe’s chief said.267 “We
know that nobody wants to leave, but it’s about staying together.”268
Although a final site has not yet been chosen, plans call for the construction
of a new village designed in accordance with traditional tribal architecture
and with enough capacity to welcome back members of the community who
have moved away from Isle de Jean Charles in past decades but would like
to return.269
Still, the magnitude of the success should not be overstated. The
community is already little more than a shadow of its former self. It has lost
265. DALBOM ET AL., supra note 190, at 4.
266. Davenport & Robertson, supra note 110; see also Lauren Zanolli,
Louisiana’s Vanishing Island: The Climate ‘Refugees’ Resettling for $52m,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar
/15/louisiana-isle-de-jean-charles-island-sea-level-resettlement [https://perma.cc/4
Y43-UPCA].
267. Zanolli, supra note 266.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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98% of its land since 1955, and its population has already dwindled from
a peak of 400 residents to about 85 residents.270 The only road to the
community routinely floods, cutting it off completely from the outside
world, and many homes have already been destroyed by hurricanes.271
Meanwhile, the idea of resettling the town has been debated for well over
a decade; residents voted against similar proposals in 2002 and 2009.272
Even the current decision does not require residents to leave, and several
insist that they will remain where they are.273 The cost of resettlement is
also a concern. The project is funded by a federal grant of $48 million to
resettle less than 100 people, far more than it would cost to condemn all
the property in the town.274
Although Isle de Jean Charles may be the first community resettled
because of climate change, it is not the first community that has been
moved to avoid floods. In 1978, the entire town of Allenville, Arizona was
moved after disastrous flooding.275 So was Valmeyer, Illinois, which was
flooded by the Mississippi River in 1993 and subsequently relocated atop
a bluff two miles away.276 In both cases the resettlement was made possible
by federal funding, and in both cases the resettled communities were
located in rural areas and were able to move to higher ground nearby. 277
Notably, not all of the communities that were flooded in 1993 relocated like

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Residents of Shaktoolik, Alaska, a 250-person town that sits on a rapidly
disappearing barrier island and faces periodic flooding from storm surges, also
recently decided not to relocate to higher ground. The town’s mayor explained that
they would “stay and defend.” Erica Goode, A Wrenching Choice for Alaska Towns
in the Path of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), http://nyti.ms
/2gDjuqL [https://perma.cc/E6RJ-97PW?safari=1]. Shishmaref, a small Inupiat
community in Alaska that also sits on a barrier island, recently voted to relocate to
a new site five miles inland. The vote was 89 to 78. Christopher Mele & Daniel
Victor, Reeling from Effects of Climate Change, Alaskan Village Votes to Relocate,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2bmfTx5 [https://perma.cc /4MUKUMVX?safari=1]; see also Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community
Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights
Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 373–92 (2011) (describing
challenges involved in effort to relocate Newtok, Alaska).
273. Davenport & Robertson, supra note 110.
274. Id.
275. DALBOM ET AL., supra note 190, at 7–8.
276. Id. at 7–9.
277. Id.
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Valmeyer. Chesterfield, Missouri experienced a post-flood development
boom.278
Given this history, it is hard to see resettlement as a scalable solution
to the problem of rising seas. Even tiny, close-knit communities facing
already-dire loss of land have had trouble agreeing to move. The cost of
constructing new communities is also high and it is likely to be more
feasible in some areas than in others. Finding a site for the new community
of Isle de Jean Charles in rural southern Louisiana may not be an
insurmountable obstacle; it is harder to know where communities along
the more densely populated East Coast, like Tangier Island in Chesapeake
Bay, could be placed. It is also difficult to know how resettlement could
be applied to urban areas like New Orleans or Miami.
Still, resettlement should be thought of as one of the tools governments
can use to foster politically palatable retreat, at least in certain limited
circumstances. From the perspective of residents, resettlement is preferable
because of the continuity it offers and the values it conveys.279 From the
perspective of governments, it presents a way of moving constituents to
safety without losing them altogether.280 But the national scope of the
problem will require more tools.
2. Memorials
When governments cannot feasibly resettle communities wholesale,
they may have to consider other ways of providing some of the emotional
salve of rebuilding while enforcing a policy of retreat. Memorials can be
a form of social meaning overdetermination in that they provide
affirmation of the value of victims’ communities and ways of life. This
affirmation could make some form of retreat more palatable. Memorials
can be powerful expressions of societal judgment about important events.
By honoring the dead, memorials demonstrate the value of lives lost and
the merits of the cause for which they perished, or the unacceptability of
the cause of their death. There is no national memorial to the victims of
traffic accidents, of which there are about 30,000 every year, but the names
of the roughly 3,000 victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks are etched in

278. Id.; KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra note 184, at 130–31.
279. See, e.g., Davenport & Robertson, supra note 110 (noting that resettlement
allows people to be moved away from flood zones “without tearing communities
apart”).
280. DALBOM ET AL., supra note 190, at 49 (“[T]he easiest option for all
stakeholders is to do nothing. This is the default. It is the disorganized scattering
of people out of coastal communities to who-knows-where.”).
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bronze at a memorial located on the spot where most of them died.281 This
is because society views the risk of dying in a car crash as an acceptable
fact of modern life, worth the gains in time and convenience from driving
around in cars, but the risk of even a single American dying in a terrorist
attack is regarded as unacceptable.282 The message is not quite that victims
did not die in vain, which Americans are often inclined to say about those
who die fighting in wars, but that their deaths will be marked off as distinct
from all other deaths, uniquely wrong and uniquely unacceptable.283 In this
sense, a memorial can also be seen as an act of revenge, or at least part of
a process of revenge.284 Like violent revenge, memorials mark what
occurred as wrong and thereby elevate those who were wronged, restoring
a measure of status when there is no way to restore the most important
loss: a life.
On a less theoretical level, the 9/11 memorial provides a good
illustration of the level of society’s concern for the victims and the way in
which their deaths will be remembered. The debate over whether and how
to rebuild the Twin Towers began almost as soon as they were destroyed.285
The office buildings that would replace the World Trade Center and the
memorial that would honor the victims were the subject of international
design competitions, which drew entries from all over the world.286 The
memorial eventually included the names of all the victims, listed not
alphabetically but according to “meaningful adjacencies” designed to
281. See 9/11 MEMORIAL & MUSEUM, https://www.911memorial.org/memorial
(last visited Nov. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/N4XN-8Z54].
282. See HARRIET F. SENIE, MEMORIALS TO SHATTERED MYTHS: VIETNAM TO
9/11, at 7 (2016) (“The question of which category of victim deserves a monument
is fundamentally political, and the answer depends on the meanings that society
assigns to their trauma. The severity of the trauma is not the crucial factor, but
rather its collective significance.”).
283. See id.; DAVID SIMPSON, 9/11: THE CULTURE OF COMMEMORATION (“It
is conventional to dignify the dead, to disguise any sense that death may be
without meaning or purpose.”); JOHN BODNAR, REMAKING AMERICA: PUBLIC
MEMORY, COMMEMORATION, AND PATRIOTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3–9
(1992) (describing the movement to create a Vietnam veterans memorial as a way
to correct “the attitude of many Vietnam veterans that the nation had betrayed and
neglected them after their return home”).
284. Edward T. Linenthal, The Predicament of Aftermath: Oklahoma City and
September 11, in THE RESILIENT CITY: HOW MODERN CITIES RECOVER FROM
DISASTER 55, 64–65 (Lawrence J. Vale & Richard Campanella eds., 2005)
(“[S]uch memorials are acts of protest as much as acts of remembrance . . . .”).
285. SIMPSON, supra note 283, at 226.
286. Id. at 79 (noting that the memorial competition drew 5,201 entrants from
63 countries).
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capture the real-life connections between the dead. The adjacencies were
determined partially by an algorithm designed for the purpose and also in
response to some 1,200 individual requests, all of which were
accommodated.287
There is, by contrast, no national memorial to the victims of Hurricane
Katrina. The city of New Orleans’s official Hurricane Katrina memorial is
located in a cemetery.288 Designed by a local coroner, it holds the bodies
of about 80 people whose remains were either unidentified or unclaimed
after the storm.289 In the center is a simple granite plaque bearing a few
paragraphs of information about the storm.290 On a neutral ground in the
Lower Ninth Ward, another memorial consists of vertical blue pillars
marking the depth of floodwaters.291 Some memorials have been more
pointed in assigning responsibility for the flooding. Standing in the water
in the middle of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a navigation channel
created by the Army Corps of Engineers in 1965 that helped funnel
Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge into New Orleans, is a large, elaborately
decorated metal cross.292 A local non-profit formed after the storm to
advocate for stronger levees is in the process of installing a series of
historical markers at the site of various levee breaches. The non-profit’s
first marker, at the 17th Street Canal, is pointed in its criticism of the
Corps.293 Whatever one might say about the various Hurricane Katrina

287. SENIE, supra note 282, at 158.
288. The memorial is so obscure that it was featured in a segment on the local
ABC affiliate entitled “The Katrina memorial you don’t know about.” See The
Katrina Memorial You Don’t Know About (WGNO ABC television broadcast Aug.
12, 2015), http://wgno.com/2015/08/11/the-katrina-memorial-you-dont-know-about
[https://perma.cc/WZ6X-XM9C].
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. Sara Le Menestrel, Memory Lives in New Orleans: The Process and Politics
of Commemoration, in HURRICANE KATRINA IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 153,
161–62 (Romain Huret & Randy J. Sparks eds., 2014).
292. Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, At Katrina St. Bernard Memorial Remembering the Dead, Many Want to Forget, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 29, 2015),
http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2015/08/katrina_memorial_shell_beach.html
[https://perma.cc/Z66Y-GAEJ].
293. The marker reads in part:
This breach was one of 50 ruptures in the Federal Flood Protection
System that occurred that day. In 2008, the US District Court, Eastern
District of Louisiana placed responsibility for this floodwall’s collapse
squarely on the US Army Corps of Engineers; however, the agency is
protected from financial liability in the Flood Control Act of 1928.
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memorials that currently exist, it is clear that they do not represent a kind
of national accounting in the way the 9/11 memorial does.
Would a more concerted effort at memorialization in the wake of
natural disasters help create a sense of repair for victims, lessening the
drive to rebuild? There is reason to think so.294 If opposition to retreat is
partially driven by the disrespect it expresses toward a community or way
of life, then memorialization can act as a powerful counterweight.
Memorials like those constructed after wars can also help cast losses as
tragically permanent alterations in our lives rather than temporary setbacks
to be overcome. Undertaking this effort might mean establishing memorials
to the victims of particular disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. It might
also mean building a national memorial to those displaced by climate
change.295
Of course, it is hard to make the strong causal claim that a Hurricane
Katrina memorial would have made some discrete number of individuals
willing to relocate rather than rebuild. The power of memorials lies in their
ability to help shape the way a culture responds to loss. Post-flood
memorials could thus be one tool, along with rhetorical strategies like not
personifying hurricanes and renaming “retreat,” in the broader, nascent
effort to reshape our cultural response to catastrophic floods. What is
needed is a normalization of the idea that some coastal areas will disappear
and that nothing can be done to save them. Using the cultural tools often
brought to bear in the wake of tragedy might help further this vitally
important project.

Historic Plaque Program, LEVEES.ORG, http://levees.org/historic-plaque-program/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CBH4-BS5Z].
294. See Funerals and Memorials: A Part of Recovery, CTR. FOR THE STUDY
OF TRAUMATIC STRESS, https://www.cstsonline.org/assets/media/documents/CSTS
_funerals_memorials.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (noting that memorials
“provide an opportunity to show appreciation for the person, to grieve together, and
to make a new beginning”) [https://perma.cc/KS9G-YD8W].
295. One intriguing possibility is the design that recently won the “Memorials
for the Future” competition sponsored by the National Park Service. Entitled
“Climate Chronograph,” the memorial would consist of cherry trees planted in a
low-lying public park in Washington, D.C., that would die off in successive rows
as they were poisoned by salt water from rising seas. See Erin Blakemore, What
Will the Memorials of the Future Look Like?, SMITHSONIAN (Sept. 13, 2016),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/what-will-memorials-future-look180960401/ [https://perma.cc/79FW-MNJQ].
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C. Resistance, Redirected
If rebuilding is in some circumstances an act of resistance against
governmental neglect, endangerment, and eviction, then it can begin to look
like a form of false consciousness. Flood victims who insist on rebuilding
in defiance of governmental efforts to get them to leave may express anger
towards the storms that destroyed their homes and the government that
would like to keep them from coming home, but rebuilding often simply
recreates the risk that harmed them in the first place. Anger could more
productively be directed at holding the government to account.
Unfortunately, sovereign immunity almost entirely forecloses lawsuits
against the federal government for causing or contributing to the harms
associated with floods. The Flood Control Act of 1928 indemnifies the federal
government for flood damage related to the construction of levees, no matter
how negligent.296 Plaintiffs in New Orleans appeared to have found a way
around this bar when they sued the Corps of Engineers for negligently
maintaining the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a navigation canal, rather than
a flood control structure, which was found to have funneled Hurricane
Katrina’s storm surge into the city and thus contributed to the flooding.297
Nevertheless, the negligent maintenance of the canal was eventually held to
fall within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, barring the plaintiffs’ case as a matter of sovereign immunity.298 The
various shortcomings in the federal government’s response to the storm
would seem to enjoy the same protection.299
Setting aside sovereign immunity for the harms associated with flood
damage—in addition to helping make victims whole financially—would
provide a forum in which victims’ anger could be channeled against the
government for failing to keep them safe rather than for trying to make
them safer by moving them to less risky areas. Lawsuits that aim to assign
296. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012).
297. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644
(E.D. La. 2009).
298. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir.
2012). Somewhat bizarrely, the same Fifth Circuit panel had written a different
opinion affirming the decision below in favor of the plaintiffs six months earlier.
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 673 F.3d 381 (2012). A separate case
proceeding on a takings theory has so far enjoyed more success. St. Bernard Parish
Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (Fed. Cl. 2015), appeal docketed, No.
16-2301 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 6, 2016).
299. See Armstead v. Nagin, No. 05-6438, 2006 WL 3861769, at *5–6 (E.D.
La. Dec. 29, 2006) (dismissing suit against President Bush, among others, for
failure to provide timely assistance after Hurricane Katrina).

2017]

STRONGER THAN THE STORM

497

responsibility for flood damage to particular governmental policies also
highlight the government’s shortcomings, shaping public discourse even
when they do not succeed in court.300 They might thus help victims shift
their focus away from needing to claim a victory over the forces of nature
by rebuilding and toward seeking a victory over those human actors who
have contributed to the risk they face in a variety of ways.
CONCLUSION
The United States faces a staggering task over the next century: managing
the inundation of the homes of between 4 and 13 million people.301 Even
though the effects of sea level rise are already beginning to be felt, there has
so far been no implementation of a policy of retreat at any meaningful scale.
One of the key obstacles standing in the way of safer housing patterns is the
intense desire to rebuild in the wake of major floods. Understanding and
addressing the roots of this impulse is of crucial importance if regulatory
approaches to retreat are to be implemented successfully. Although there is
no single analysis that applies to every individual in every situation, the
impulse to rebuild can be seen as a form of revenge, culture, and resistance.
Appreciating these aspects of rebuilding highlights the importance of the
various messages it sends and suggests ways in which those same restorative
messages might be sent without helping people move right back to the water’s
edge.

300. Perhaps owing in part to the litigation discussed above, closing the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet became a cause celebre in the years following
Hurricane Katrina. It was eventually blocked off by a berm in July 2009. See Bob
Warren, MR-GO Going: Closure of Waterway Begins, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 30,
2009), http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/01/mrgo_going_closure_of_water
way.html [https://perma.cc/5CM3-U88T]; Martha Carr, Mississippi River Gulf Outlet
Now Blocked with 352,000 Tons of Rock, TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 24, 2009),
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/07/tp_archivethe_us_army_corps.htm
l (“[M]any elected officials and residents of St. Bernard Parish, eastern New
Orleans and the 9th Ward loudly criticized the waterway as the cause of the deadly
flooding that decimated the region.”) [https://perma.cc/S5VG-VGCR].
301. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

